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Month: April 2021

Double Affiliation

How can non-German socialists combine local activism with the politics of their home country?


08/04/2021

I was born in Palencia in Spain almost 32 years ago and have lived in Berlin since 2016. I started to be active in Izquierda Unida (United Left – IU) at the end of 2015, at first as a sympathizer, then as a member, and currently I participate in the assembly of IU Berlin. In 2018 my situation in the German capital was stabilizing and every day it became clearer to me that I would stay here for a long time. That’s why I decided to join Die Linke in 2019 in my district, in Steglitz-Zehlendorf. Die Linke and IU are sister organizations, and both belong to the Party of the European Left and the Left Group in the European Parliament.

I am a double member because I have a double status, that of a Spanish emigrant and that of an immigrant and resident in Germany. As such, the decisions taken in Spain affect my rights (health care, voting rights) or, for example, the perspective of my possible return. Similarly, decisions taken in the Bundestag affect my material conditions (such as housing), my labor rights or my future prospects in Berlin. For this reason, dual affiliation becomes a mechanism to convey the demands of this dual condition.

The double affiliation in two political parties (beyond other types of membership in trade unions, associations, social movements, etc.) is enriching. You learn to participate in two organizations, each with its own mechanisms of functioning, with its own political communicative and strategic lines – which are similar yet distinct. This enables the accumulation of an enormous political-organizational know-how to add to one’s toolbox. You learn different ways of addressing the same issues, sometimes conditioned by the reality of the country itself, but often with a perspective that allows you to apply your experiences and knowledge from one organization to another.

We are internationalists and that is why the double affiliation becomes a condition in which fraternal ties are strengthened, in which we fight more closely side by side for social justice, for environmental protection, for socialism or for peace. We are militants who, as stated in the documents approved by a majority in the XII Asamblea Federal of IU (the twelfth federal assembly of the United Left), held in late March, “help us to build a network of solidarity and cooperation between left organizations”. Internationalism is also built every day by the base and, in this, migration plays a fundamental role.

The double affiliation is also an endurance test: meetings that overlap, schedules and ways of organizing the day that vary between countries and customs; meetings in different languages (Spanish, German, also in English), parallel organizations of events… This way of working cannot always fit into a 24 hour day and sometimes involves deciding which organization to give preference at a given time. This does not mean leaving the other affiliation (far from it), but trying to establish a scale of priorities according to the moment and the situation not only of the organization itself, but of the general social and political context.

There are days when consecutive meetings mean spending several hours in front of a screen. In many cases, like my own, this is after having spent many hours in front of that same screen working. This means both physical and mental fatigue, and also can sometimes prevent you from enjoying other forms of free time, the company of family, friends or partner, or simply the legitimate right to do absolutely nothing.

At this point you may wonder whether it is worth dedicating so much time to this task. The answer is yes. The pros outweigh the cons and, above all, the spirit of striving together in a broad and diverse community is very rewarding and breathes energy into the most exhausting days. Building bridges is what we do instead of putting up walls, as do the extreme right and the nationalist trends that shake Europe and the whole world, because

“Across the frontiers and seas the workers of all nations reach out to each other the hands for a brotherly union; against the international reactionary power of capitalism rises the international revolutionary power of the working class.

The capitalist exploitation unites the workers without difference of trade, sex, religion, and nationality, into the one revolutionary army, that is going to conquer a new world, where labour has all to win and nothing to lose but its chains.”

(Clara Zetkin).

This article first appeared in Spanish in la Region internacional

The Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism and its Potential

Despite some minor flaws, the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism offers a step forward in the fight against the instrumentalisation of antisemitism


06/04/2021

25 March 2021 saw the release of the ‘Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism’ (JDA), a document that emerged from a year-long collaboration between scholars in the fields of Holocaust history, Jewish studies and Middle East studies, and was signed by over 200 academics from these and related disciplines. After years of damage caused by the ‘working definition’ of antisemitism launched by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), which has been circulating since 2016, there is finally a competing document with substantial intellectual weight behind it. Indeed, the JDA specifically states its aim of replacing the IHRA definition.

For years, activists and academics, and even one of the main contributors to the IHRA definition, Kenneth Stern, have complained that the document is being used as a universal standard and an instrument to restrict freedom of speech. It is ironic that something proposed as a working definition – ostensibly a work in progress, something subject to further modification and refinement over time – should have established itself as an incontestable yardstick, a document that lobby groups could pressure organisations and institutions in the fields of academia, culture, politics and even sport to adopt formally. For many in Europe and North America, its validity is so self-evident that to challenge it is to undermine the fight against antisemitism and insult the Jews who are at risk of such discrimination.

Far from being a primarily Jewish attitude, this view has established itself among many non-Jewish groups and individuals who wish to demonstrate their commitment to that worthy cause. Indeed, an important factor in their embrace of the definition – alongside lobbying pressure – is the fact that it appears to give them clarity on an issue that a surprising number of them seem to have difficulty understanding. This is because waters that should be quite clear have been muddied by the discursive dominance of the issue of Israel, its occupation of Palestinian land and its violence towards Palestinians.

Evidence-based criticism

Another contradiction in the IHRA definition is its combination of vagueness and restrictive specificity. While the definition itself, which is followed by eleven examples (of which seven deal with Israel), speaks nebulously of a ‘certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews’, the examples seek to proscribe such statements as ‘The state of Israel is a racist endeavour’. By failing to draw clear lines between racial prejudice and political positions, the IHRA makes it very easy to discredit the latter through accusations of the former. After a preamble, the JDA echoes this structure by providing a concise definition – ‘Antisemitism is discrimination, prejudice, hostility or violence against Jews as Jews (or Jewish institutions as Jewish)’ – and following this with guidelines and examples. One particularly important passage at the very end states:

Criticism that some may see as excessive or contentious, or as reflecting a ‘double standard,’ is not, in and of itself, antisemitic. In general, the line between antisemitic and non-antisemitic speech is different from the line between unreasonable and reasonable speech.

In other words, a political statement should be assessed first of all on the basis of its political content; this means that a statement about Israel should be viewed first of all as applying to the state, not to Jews, and the JDA also emphasises that ‘evidence-based’ criticism of the state is not inherently antisemitic.

As a result, the JDA makes previously unspeakable issues negotiable: support for boycotting Israel or the demand for a single Israeli-Palestinian state are not in themselves discriminatory, and the reader is reminded that boycotts are a time-honoured political tool. No doubt this will enrage pro-Israel actors whose argumentation rests on the assertion that these are, in fact, antisemitic – such as the 2019 anti-BDS resolution passed in the Bundestag. Thankfully, the text does not embark on any deliberations on supposedly troubling associations or undertones, such as the Nazi boycott of Jewish businesses, making clear that this is an optional debate that is unnecessary for purposes of definition. Such debates play into the hands of those who assert the centrality of coded expressions of antisemitism, antisemitic ‘tropes’, for almost any critical statement about Israel.

Just as years of debate about a definition of antisemitism have mainstreamed the notion that such a document is necessary, the endless discussions of codes and tropes has widely established the premise that the importance of coded references is unique to antisemitism and its history. Yet it should go without saying that any tradition of prejudice has its own tropes, some more obvious and some more coded, some more aggressive and some more subtle. The implication that Muslims are fanatics, that black people are inherently violent or uncontrolled, that homosexuals are deviants who spread disease and probably engage in pedophilia too, that Roma and Travellers are born thieves and liars, and so forth – all of these prejudices are encountered in daily life and studied by academics. Rich, hook-nosed Jews plotting to take over the world are just one more figure in this universe of discrimination and dehumanisation.

Recognising the importance of bringing disadvantaged groups together for the cause of anti-racism and anti-discrimination is crucial, and the JDA explicitly recognises this, asserting that ‘while antisemitism has certain distinctive features, the fight against it is inseparable from the overall fight against all forms of racial, ethnic, cultural, religious, and gender discrimination.’ Such an acknowledgement is sorely lacking in the IHRA definition.

The importance of context

By stating that certain views or formulations are not antisemitic ‘on the face of it’, the JDA emphasises the importance of context. In other words, it encourages thinking rather than blind obedience and knockdown arguments. The twisted logic that repeatedly leads to the defamation of pro-Palestine activists, including Jews, is done away with. In the FAQ section, which is helpful in discussing applications and interpretations of important points, the reply to a question about distinguishing between antisemitism and anti-Zionism clarifies:

The two concepts are categorically different. Nationalism, Jewish or otherwise, can take many forms, but it is always open to debate. Bigotry and discrimination, whether against Jews or anyone else, is never acceptable. This is an axiom of the JDA.

A central paradox in the discourse around what some (especially in Germany) call ‘Israel-related antisemitism’, mirrored in the IHRA definition, is that the conflation of Jews and Israel is condemned as antisemitic on the one hand, for example in the case of hostilities against Jewish people due to the violent acts of ‘their’ state, but on the other hand, this conflation is continued with positive connotations – a vicious circle. Similarly, one of the greatest absurdities of the IHRA document is that it decries the application of ‘double standards’ to Israel, a notion that is routinely used to challenge criticism that is considered normal when applied to other states with democratic deficits.

Only a separation of the two categories can curb such tendencies, and this separation is explicitly attempted by the JDA, as in its statement that anti-Zionism is not antisemitic. Moreover, pro-Israel individuals and organisations must now be confronted more strongly with the question of whether their own stance is not also characterised by antisemitic generalisation and conflation.

Some criticisms of the JDA

All this does not mean that there is no reason to criticise the JDA, and indeed, while its reception among progressive organisations (including various Jewish ones) has been largely positive, reservations have been expressed, not least on the Palestinian side. One is that the very name of the document immediately places the focus on the Israel-Palestine issue, which is thus immediately in play; antisemitism without reference to Israel is dealt with in the first points, but is automatically placed second by the naming. This framing is, of course, a reaction to the discourse poisoned by the IHRA definition, and the JDA emphasises several times that it sees itself as a correction of that. Still, one could criticise the JDA for engaging in this game and perpetuating the association.

There is also barely any reference to the most immediate antisemitic threat, which comes from the far right and white supremacism; there is merely one sentence in the FAQ stating that ‘The general guidelines (1-5) apply in all contexts, including the far right, where antisemitism is increasing.’ Moreover, while it emphasises that antisemitism and the understanding of it should not have special status, it potentially encourages this assumption by explicitly recommending itself as a ‘substitute’ for the IHRA definition. Although it states that it does not want to be a binding code either, it fails to point out that the very assumption that such a document is needed at all, and only for antisemitism, not for Islamophobia, anti-black racism, anti-queer discrimination and the like, is problematic in itself.

Also, the Palestinian perspective could be taken more into account – for example, a seemingly classically antisemitic statement about the excessive power of ‘the Jews’ or the unique evil of Israel would have a completely different meaning if made by traumatised residents of the blockaded and bombed Gaza Strip. The existence of such long-standing tropes as well-poisoning or child-murdering Jews is no reason to refrain from pointing out the genuine poisoning of wells in the West Bank, or the killing of some 500 children in the bombardment of Gaza in 2014. However, the document’s emphasis on discussion and context is not really compatible with such equations. Some of these questions and others are addressed in the FAQ appendix, which, in further contrast to the IHRA text, shows how the principles explained can help in evaluating statements and actions. This demonstrates how much the authors have also thought about the possible misuse of their document.

Why has the declaration been written?

Moreover, it is important to consider the purpose and target audience of the JDA. It was not written for Palestinians in order to tell them what they are allowed to say; it was written to counter those who instrumentalise antisemitism as a political weapon to attack solidarity with Palestinians, very often using the IHRA definition to do so. Many organisations that have felt the need to adopt the latter did so in order to demonstrate that they are on the side of Jews and because they were afraid of offending them; accordingly, some will feel that the JDA is not sufficiently clear and simple. The European Union even published a handbook for the application of the IHRA, further entrenching its failings. The JDA makes suggestions rather than presenting a checklist. But if it can achieve anything, it is this: to undermine that simplistic concept. While accepting the importance of the Israel-Palestine issue for purposes of debate – it is difficult to rebut an argument without addressing it – it can perhaps be used to show those who would prevent any debate that the matter cannot be viewed in such a reductive way. Another definition recently launched, the Nexus Document, contributes to this by its very existence; the more definitions or interpretations that are circulating, the less convincing the idea of a single one will seem.

It remains to be seen whether the JDA can change the discourse and counteract the suppression and demonisation of pro-Palestine activism and views. This cannot happen overnight; the damage done by the IHRA definition over the last five years or more is immense, and those who seek to avoid or prevent debate will not want to accept the premises of the JDA. It will be the task of activists and the small number of like-minded politicians willing to stand up against that demonisation to exert pressure and keep the discussion going. And perhaps it will turn out that the most realistic prospect is not so much the acceptance of the JDA as sowing doubt and weakening faith in the universal validity of any fixed definition.

At any rate, the wording of each individual formulation should not be the point here. The potential usefulness and strengths of the JDA far outweigh its weaknesses or omissions, and in the absence of comparable instruments with which to oppose the IHRA definition, it must be put to the test.

Die Grünen: In Praise of Green Capitalism

The German Green Party embraces capitalism, avoids talking about Left and Right, and wants to increase investment in military spending


05/04/2021

Last month, regional elections were held in some German states. In Baden-Württenberg, the Greens won a strong victory with more than 30% of the votes. Immediately, several Spanish political leaders congratulated the Green party, as is the case of Ínigo Errejón, leader of Más País, with the following text: “Congratulations to the German Greens for their victory in Baden-Württenberg. The green forces are making their way in Europe, and from Spain we pick up the torch. Without ecological transition there is no future”.

These congratulations are not unusual. After all, Errejón and Más País added part of the Equo Party to their ranks, including Inés Sabanés. Moreover, Errejón forced the number two on the list for Congress, Marta Higueras, to resign her seat to be replaced by Inés Sabanés (from Equo) and, in this way, to align with the Greens at the European level. Therefore, congratulating the Baden-Württemberg Greens would be considered normal.

But what does it mean to congratulate the Baden-Württenberg Greens? One might imagine that it would be to congratulate green or anti-capitalist policies. However, nothing could be further from the truth. The Greens in Baden-Württenberg have governed the federal state for 10 years with Winfried Kretschmann at their head. The first thing that would draw attention to his presidency is that since 2016 he has governed in a pact with Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic CDU. A priori, it is often thought that the Greens would swing more to the left. However, this is not necessarily the case in Germany, not only because of their pacts, but also because of their policies.

Kretschmann has maintained an ambiguous policy on asylum issues: while he advocated helping refugees in the Moria camps, he was skeptical about welcoming them to Germany and has even taken up the discourse that criminalizes refugees. He went as far as to propose that those who were problematic should be moved away from the big cities and distributed in the countryside, something he has of course never said about the German population, but neither has he said about white, Christian or European migrants.

Kretschmann even seems to have forgotten Green policy flagship programs, such as the reduction of the automobiles as a means of transportation. It is for this reason that even Greenpeace blacklisted him in 2016. The reason for this was that he made his election spot aboard a Daimler limousine, an Automotive multinational that donated €40,000 to The Greens for their electoral campaigns.

It could be thought that Kretschmann is a loose figure in the Greens, and while this is partly true, it is the logical deformation of an evolution of the German Greens that went from its initial ecosocialism towards a green capitalism, a contradiction in terminis that consists of not touching the production, while eating organic products transported in paper bags instead of plastic. But it even seems that nature is no longer so important. The Hessen Greens, who co-govern as a minority partner also with the Christian Democratic CDU, have supported the construction of the A-49 highway, which involves the destruction of large parts of the Dannenroeder Forst, which has led to numerous clashes with environmental activists.

In any case, the trend has been going on for a long time. The Greens define themselves as critics of capitalism, but no longer as anti-capitalists, as they were in their origins, but neither do they define themselves as anti-militarist or anti-imperialist. The former co-chair of The Greens between 2008 and 2018, Cem Oezdemir, considered that Germany has to “deploy the military abroad from a green optic,” whatever that is. Perhaps he is referring to when Joschka Fischer, foreign minister under Schroeder between 1998 and 2005, unambiguously pushed for and justified the interventions of the Bundeswehr (the German military) in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the first deployment of German troops abroad since 1945. What is more, the new co-president of the Greens, Annalena Baerbock, has clearly defended the increase in military spending and the deployment of German troops (“from a green point of view” one must assume) in foreign missions, without renouncing the imperialist umbrella of NATO.

The Greens manage to break electoral barriers with a policy that does not disturb capital and with significant support among the young and urban middle classes. The Green policy does not threaten the system, while it eases the conscience of its voters with ecological products bought in ecological and unaffordable supermarkets such as Biomarkt or Alnatura.

So, repeating the initial question, what does it mean to support The Greens of Germany by politicians like Errejón? A slogan of the Greens was “neither left nor right, forward.” Perhaps this concept sounds a little more familiar and “forward” sounds like that transversality that ends up supporting in Madrid the “Operación Chamartín” and looking at the construction cranes while eating organic mangoes brought from Brazil.

Jaime Martínez Porro is an activist and member of Izquierda Unida (IU) Berlin. This article first appeared in Spanish on the tercera Información Website.

The Dictator Against Survivors

What is Erdoğan’s Problem with Women? On the Turkish withdrawal from the 2011 Istanbul Convention protecting women’s rights


04/04/2021

On 19th of March, with a midnight Presidential decree, Turkey was pulled out of Istanbul convention, of which the country was the first signatory state. After its signing in 2011, the AKP government used the Convention for publicity and avoiding critiques for their politician’s misogynist conducts. Read from this angle, the decision is also a last sign of Erdoğan’s giving up on political legitimacy completely.

Since the withdrawal was announced on the Official Gazette [1], everybody in Turkey and abroad tried to make sense of Erdoğan’s decision. Why he did what he did and why he did it now? Indeed, the AKP government made at least five highly controversial decisions within these three days. Some of these came directly from Erdoğan and some from other state institutions completely captured by Erdoğan’s party (as in the case of HDP closure case, which was issued by the Chief Public Prosecutor).

Let us make sense of why now and why all of them at once. Let me remind you that this decision came only one day after the US and EU’s decision of no sanction over the crisis in Mediterranean see with Greece. Moreover, this decision was unpopular even in his own party, and came after he consolidated the nationalist-religious block with HDP’s closure case. Therefore, it is not completely surprising and illogical.

However, we should keep in mind that there is a lot of arbitrariness that does not allow us to find an overarching agenda Erdoğan has in mind. In fact, many of Erdoğan’s actions stems from his and his parties’ awareness that they swiftly lose legitimacy and support. These attempts sometimes result with contradictory moves. Yet, such contradictions sometime lead the opposition to claim that actions such as withdrawing from the Convention have no purpose at all and are only short-term tactical moves to win elections [2]. But I believe Erdoğan’s and his supporters’ misogyny has more long-lasting aims and consequences than simply winning elections as I show below.

Why Istanbul Convention?

Erdoğan and his allies’ misogyny is nothing new. Since the first days of the AKP power, they came under fire for their misogynist and homophobic language and deeds. So much so that, Erdoğan stated several times that he did not believe men and women were equal. His former Deputy Prime Minister Büent Arınç compared unveiled women with peeled tangerine: ‘Who would like to buy a peeled tangerine at the supermarket’ he rhetorically asked. And didn’t they signal the withdrawal before? AKP claims that the Convention wasn’t even effective since violence against women has increased since its ratification. So why are we outraged about this decision? What makes the Istanbul Convention so precious for women in Turkey?

As we know, Istanbul Convention is not under attack only in Turkey but in Hungary and Poland too. Feminist activists point out that the Convention is one of the most progressive international text on combating violence against women and other sexual minorities. It defines violence in a broader way to include violence within family and its broader spectrum: sexual, economic, emotional and physical. Moreover, it obliges the signatory states to take preventive actions. When this was not achieved, it requires them to protect the victims and bring justice by effective punishment. It recognizes non-binary sexual identities and LGBTQI+, equally requires state action in case of violence against them. In doing so, it puts the gender roles into question and recognizes violence as a political and social problem; not an anomaly conducted only by outlaws.

This, in return, puts the Convention in a direct contradiction with Erdoğan and similar leaders (of for eg Hungary) ideological and political standpoints. Indeed, he and his fellows were quite open about this: Several religious “civil society leaders” and politicians stated that their priority is to protect family – as opposed to the Convention’s emphasis on protecting individuals. This is especially problematic for them, because the individuals that are being protected are considered as the outcasts. The outcasts are ones that society needs to be cleared from.

This is why the governing party pointed the LGBTQI+ out when they explained their opposition to the Convention. According to them (and they are right), the Convention requires Turkey to recognize non-binary sexual identities and takes action to create an egalitarian society. Erdoğan plays with his supporters’ conservative religious “sensitivities” by saying that they cannot keep Turkey in a convention that requires the country to allow same-sex marriage. These are the same people who think LGBTQI+ is an acronym for a terrorist organization and asks protesting students whether they are members!

But make no mistake: They are equally hostile to women. For religious nationalists3, women are only worth “protecting” when they are in line with their conservative family values and when they ‘know their place’. That is why, they can be so reckless to withdraw from an international convention that combats violence against women when women are killed by their exes, husbands, family members every day! The protection that the AKP is willing to provide is a selective one – only “family women” are worthy and this is a chastening process. This is why specifically feminists, and the protesting women are targeted. This is why women that are visible and vocal in public are so much hated by Erdoğan and his allies. And this is why even women in his own party who saw the gravity of withdrawal and opposed it were terrorized and punished by men in higher places of their clerical rule [4].

Indeed, these very same people and groups call also for withdrawal from Lanzarote and CEDAW. The first is another Convention brought about by Council of Europe which aims to protect children from sexual abuse and misconducts. In their language, this is against Turkish family structure and corrupts Turkish society. You might wonder how. But let me remind you: Three years ago, the head of Directorate of Religious Affairs announced that girls as young as nine can marry according to religious law. On top of that, one of third of women in Turkey get married under the age of eighteen. Therefore, I believe this is a full-fledged war to build their masculine tyranny. It goes much beyond a simple populist action to win elections. On the contrary, when taking into account that at least sixty percent of Turkish population opposes the decision of withdrawal, it is hard to understand why this decision will help them to win elections. All it can do is to consolidate this tyrannical rule and only satisfy Erdoğan’s most radical supporters.

With all this in mind, I believe the decision is also a message to the opposition. For years now, feminist and LGBT struggle has been at the core of the social movements that opposes Erdoğan’s Turkish-Islamic rule. Struggles against male violence and sexual abuse are the main pillars of this movement. Such international conventions and the gains we had, thanks to nothing but our international feminist struggle, provide solid ground for our demands. By taking this action, Erdoğan and Co, aim to deprive us from our rights and moreover crush the movement.

However, these lasts actions to consolidate his base are likely to blow back on his face, especially when his decisions aren’t backed by a strong economy. Moreover, despite setbacks and losses we faced, and despite an incredible level of violence, the women’s struggle in Turkey has become one of the most inspiring movement in our history. As a young movement that only flourished as an independent movement (as opposed to earlier movements that were part of socialist organizations) in ‘90s, we already acquired many gains, Istanbul Convention is being one of them. Hence, it is unlikely that Erdoğan will succeed in erasing the hard-won gains.

Zozan Baran is an activist and currently independent scholar from Turkey of Kurdish descent. She obtained her BA from Boğaziçi University Political Science department and MA from Freie Universitaet Berlin Sociology department. She currently resides in Berlin and continues to write on political regimes and movements from a comparative perspective.

Footnotes

1 An official gazette is the legal newspaper of a country, or of an administrative part of a country, which publishes the text of new laws, decrees, regulations, treaties, legal notices, and court decisions. The laws published in official gazettes are primary law in the official source; publication in the gazette, in many cases, initiates jurisdiction. The text published is the authoritative version, and commonly, the only published version. (https://www.crl.edu/collections/topics/official-gazettes)

2 There are rumors that Erdoğan will announce early elections.

3 And of course, it isn’t limited to them and shared by a wider segment of the society.

4 A notorious Islamist writer from a newspaper that can be compared to Bild in Germany, Abdurrahman Dilipak called members of KADEM (a religious women organization that mostly defended very conservative policies but opposed withdrawal) whores. The newly appointed Imam of Hagia Sophia similarly demonized Özlem Zengin, the AKP Group Deputy Chair Woman.

ZeroCovid

For a left-wing solution to the Covid crisis


02/04/2021

2,75 million people have so far died from Covid-19. In many countries a third wave of the pandemic is rolling, incidences are rising, driven by more contagious and more dangerous mutations. At the same time, vaccinations progress far too slowly to provide an effective counterforce. Yet governments still stick to failed anti-pandemic strategies. With some shortsighted lobbyists campaigning heavily against measures intended to reduce spread, factories, offices, schools and stores are kept open at any cost, including health.

The Zero Covid strategy offers a perspective for a way out of the pandemic. By bringing down case numbers as rapidly as possible in a joint effort based on solidarity and sustaining this success, we could avoid thousands more deaths, prevent many infections and subsequent suffering from long covid or other permanent damage.

#ZeroCovid is calling for a Europe-wide shutdown with the aim of pushing the new infections down to zero, so that we can overcome the pandemic in a sustainable fashion. This is the only way that we can quickly restore personal, cultural and political liberties and activities, and fight psychological symptoms of fatigue.

The economy should be shut down as much as possible, with a comprehensive rescue package for all. This can be financed by special levies on corporate profits and very high wealth. The call of the campaign #ZeroCovid has already been signed by more that 100,000 people in Germany since 14th January 2021.

On the Day Of Action, Zero Covid groups from around the world will make their voices heard. We would be very happy if you participate in this day with your own organizations, actions, and slogans. The actions can take place on- or offline. Some example include:

  • Rallies in front of central political actors (e.g. federal or state ministries for health, education, labor, social affairs)

  • Marking the mentioned actors, e.g. by projecting slogans/graphics on their facades

  • Flash mobs, demonstrations and other offline actions

  • Disseminating the posters, online, or on walls, signs, etc.

  • Online postings/mass mailings to specific state or federal politicians, etc.-

Our ZeroCovid Campaign will simultaneously host an online demonstration with international participants on that day, and we offer and would love to give additional visibility to your local actions during this event, as well as on all our social media and other channels.

If you would like to speak during our online event, live stream from your local event, or send us photos, videos, and/or texts to be presented there, please contact us at zerocovid@gmx.net.