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“The only way for Russians to end this war is convince soldiers to stop fighting”

Interview with a Russian Socialistist about the anti-war movement in Russia

Phil Butland
05/04/2022

Thanks for being here and talking to us. Could you start by introducing yourself. Who are you? What’s your background? What are you doing in Berlin-Brandenburg?

My name is Sasha. I was born in Ukraine, but I grew up and spent most of my life in Moscow. I’m a member of a number of Russian anti-war initiatives. In Berlin, I’m doing a PhD on the socialist women’s movement in the Soviet Union after the Second World War.

Could you say something about the Russian Socialist Movement? Who is it? How big is it and what are its general politics?

The movement was founded in 2011 as a result of the unification of number of progressive left movements in Russia. They are progressive, left democratic socialists. They used to want a revolution, but now it’s become a bit more realistic. They keep taking part in grassroots activism and protests, but also during recent years, they decided to take part in the elections.

For example, at the last Parliament elections, they supported Mikhail Lobanov, a democratic socialist and trade union activist, who won the campaign on the ground. But then our elections were stolen via internet voting. They also had a number of other candidates in different regional elections.

In contemporary Russia, elections are not something that stabilised the system, quite the opposite, they normally cause protests and mass mobilization — first, through the movement of election observers, and later with mobilization of the electorate whose votes were stolen. After the last elections, there were some protests, but not as huge as we were expecting. But we believe that it is an important experience of politicization for many people.

So we are looking for new tactics in the current political situation in Russia. Our movements are involved in different anti-war initiatives. We are acting in these initiatives anonymously because it’s safer. Our movement had been open, but the current political situation in Russia does not allow us to be that open any more.

The Russian Socialist Movement has issued several statements, it keeps running its social media, but the focus is more on the domestic situation in Russia. They are trying to cooperate more with trade unions, local student organisations and other grassroots organisations.

Could you say something about the recent anti-war protests in Russia? One or two weeks ago, the Western media was full of these protests. And now there’s very little coverage. Does this mean that the protests have stopped?

The truth is that such visible protest which is so common for liberal democracy is just not a good tactic for the Russian authoritarian state. The recent protests brought more demoralisation than inspiration to people. Around 15,000 were detained. Others have received fines. There was another attempt to organise these huge street protests on 2nd April, but it was unsuccessful.

The police have learned how to prevent crowds on the street from uniting. They blocked the major streets and the major squares. Although hundreds of people were coming from different directions, they were not able to meet each other and join their forces. This brought a lot of frustration and disappointment.

It is of course important for people to feel co-presence, but in regimes like Russia where the state has had so many years to perfect its mobilization against any type of street politics, we have to come up with different tactics. Activists are spreading leaflets and stickers, printing out prohibited media and putting them into post boxes in their neighbourhoods, etc. There has been already a catalogue of different anti-war activities developed.

Feminist Anti-war Resistance have called a Women in Black protest, which was started by Israeli women against the occupation of Palestine in 1988. The women* dressed in black stay in silence in crowded places. When people approach them, they start talking, they explain what’s going on. Since it has been announced, hundreds, if not thousands, of women from all over the country, including small villages took part part.

There are many creative actions, like commemoration of people killed by Russian army in Mariupol by putting up wooden crosses, as people in Mariupol have to. The goal was to gather 5000 crosses all over the country, as many as there are civilian victims in Mariupol — the action took place in at least 41 cities and towns. People made these crosses, attached information about Mariupol victims and put up the crosses in their yards, near their houses or on bus stops — wherever people can see them.

One more tactic, borrowed from Turkmenistan, is to write anti-war slogans like “No War” on banknotes. A growing number of people is not only making, but receiving these banknotes in the cafe or from the ATM.

The current anti-war movement is emphasizing the importance of security. We should not expose ourselves to police violence. There is still not the level of grassroots mobilisation against the war that would allow sacrificing yourself for the cause. People are still very atomised, very afraid.

So, the idea is just to spread information and show resistance and discontent on the everyday level while keeping those who do it hidden so that these people feel that they are not alone, and the level of mobilization will steadily grow. There are lots of people who are against the war, so might join some anti-war protest in the future.

Is the anti-war movement making any specific demands apart from Stop the War?

It partly depends on what part of the anti-war movement you’re talking about. The demands of the demonstration on April 2nd were withdrawal of Russian troops, but also the exchange of captured soldiers from both sides, and the announcement of real military losses on the Russian side.

Another demand is the cancellation of recent anti-constitutional laws, for example one that sentences you to up to 15 years in prison for publishing “fake information about activities of Russian military forces abroad”, which means any news about the situation in Ukraine.

Some are also demanding sanctions against Russian oligarchs and even Russian oil and gas. But these demands cannot be published in Russia because it’s a criminal offence.

When the war started, we were all just shocked and started doing whatever we can without actually thinking about strategy. Our only demand was the withdrawal of Russian troops. But now we see that we need different tactics, like demanding to know the real numbers of dead soldiers or the exchange of captured soldiers.

These are tactics suggested by the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, which was established during that Afghan war and was very active during both Chechen wars. By bringing captured soldiers back, they are able to circulate the real information about what’s going on the battlefield.

This helps kill the spirit of the army because the only way to end this war is convince soldiers to stop fighting. But we have no access to the army, so the only way to circulate information in Russia is amongst their parents and colleagues, where we can promote the idea of not going to the war or leaving the battlefield and letting them know how bloody the war is.

On 1st April, regular spring conscription started in Russia – it is still compulsory. We are planning to circulate information about how to avoid conscription via websites that are popular amongst teenage boys or young adults like Twitch or 4chan. We are thinking about tactics which broaden our audience, and reach channels which are not part of feminist or Left-Wing discourse.

What can you say about the work done by anti-war activists outside Russia?

People abroad have opportunities, say, to administer Telegram channels and social media. They can post relatively safely on behalf of different types of initiatives. There are some editorial boards in exile. You can also register a fake account on a foreign phone number and spread news about what’s going on in Ukraine which is difficult for people in Russia to do via Russian social media Vk.com and Ok.ru.

We can also establish connections with different Western movements and do fundraising. For example, the Feminist anti-war resistance has launched a strike fund. They cannot crowdfund in Russia because people are already poor. But we can support those Russians who are planning to maybe go on strike and those who already were fired because of their anti-war position.

What links does the Russian anti-war movement have with activists in Ukraine?

There is an anti-imperialist struggle in Ukraine, and it’s important for the Russian anti-war movement to establish and maintain these connections. We try to support our Ukrainian comrades who are fighting to increase their visibility and support whatever demands they have.

A number of Russian anti-war initiatives are actively collaborating with Ukrainians, subsiding their social movement and offering solidarity. We normally try to support them and circulate information through our channels.

Our common ground is not what many left wing people would dream of, that we should take up guns against our own governments and capitalists on both sides because the Ukrainians, in my opinion and some of my comrades, are fighting an anti-imperialist war now in our common interest. It’s not time for them to go against their own government.

That’s very different from the Bolsheviks during the First World War, even though we do distribute Kollontai’s brochure “Who Needs the War?” from 1916, which ends with her call that our main enemy is in our country. We think that this is applicable for Russia, but we do not want argue with our Ukrainian comrades about their tactics now. We stand in full solidarity with them.

Recent polls have said that support for Putin in Russia is not just large, but it is growing. Do you think that these polls are reliable?

I’m personally very sceptical. Some agencies said the level of rejection is very high and people do not want to talk about Putin on the phone with an unknown person. Neither me, nor my friends in Russia would never pick up a phone when unknown numbers call them. None of us would discuss politics with this unknown person because the consequences are predictable and unnecessary. I don’t think in that sense we have a public sphere.

Also, there are questions like what you think about the prime minister, but the prime minister is not such a prominent public figure in Russia. It would be interesting if they did a poll and used the names of some politicians who exist and some who don’t exist. What would be support of the fake ones? This would inform us way more about public opinion (and limitations of knowledge about it) than these types of polls that just show the level of fear in society.

It’s clear that your main job as Russian socialists is to oppose Putin. There’s been a lot more debate on the international left about the role of NATO. How is NATO discussed in Russia?

We are aware that growing military spending in European countries is not something that should be supported. But for us, a very clear stance regarding Russian imperialism is of the first importance. We support military support of the Ukrainian resistance and write that Ukrainian people should have access to weapons that they need to fight Russian imperialism.

We believe that Russia should be defeated in this war and we have no illusions about any types of compromises and where they will take us. For us, right now, there is no ambivalence about Russia’s position in this war.

But as for debates in Russia, discussing NATO or sanctions in a negative way actually feeds Russian propaganda. And it’s difficult to do it in a nuanced way because that’s the main discourse of Russian public media — that we are just defending ourselves because NATO was preparing an attack on Russia. Despite the fact that NATO countries were actually providing weapons to Russia.

So, any type of engagement with criticism of NATO in Russia might be read as the opposite of a clear anti-war stance and as justification for the war. We try to avoid this topic in public discourse.

One final question. What can socialists and feminists in Germany and elsewhere do to support Russian socialists, feminists and the anti-war movement?

The best thing is to support Ukrainian comrades and their demands. We do not want our anti-war stance to be used against them. Above all, we want Ukrainian left wing and feminist activists to be heard.

Secondly, if you have any spare resources after supporting our Ukrainian comrades, you can donate to our strike fund. And circulate information about the Russian anti-war movement.

Vladimir Putin Was Decisive In Shaping Modern Capitalist Russia

Putin’s history reveal his anti-fascist credentials to be as good as Tsar Alexander II’s

Hari Kumar
04/04/2022

Some sections of the Left avoid naming Putin’s war in Ukraine as imperialist. Instead they insist war was launched to fight fascism, and point to NATO encirclement as excuses for war. These evasions are disturbing. Putin enabled the most reactionary, corrupt oligarchy and murderous thuggery of Kuchma and Yankuvich. This in turn both fueled and spiraled back to the Maidan coup of 2014 funded and driven by US and EU imperialism.

Both the Russian imperialist invasion and NATO Western imperialism are to be condemned. In real life there is often no simple ‘one’ or ‘other’. Such simplicity is for novels, belle lettres, propaganda and religious texts. Refusing to acknowledge Putin and his ‘siloviki’ as revanchist neo-imperialists, renders socialists incapable of convincing people of a socialist vision. Worse, it discredits that vision of those who see the reality of war and refugees.

Actually there is no dilemma here, for Putin’s history makes it impossible to paint him as an anti-fascist. His history is to grab riches for himself and his ‘oligarchs’ while subverting the former USSR into a capitalist state. He consolidated his rise to power with war in Chechnya. These two crimes remain relevant, and this article is confined to those two aspects.

Khrushchev and The Tension Between Light and Heavy Industry Capitalists

By 1953, the neo-capitalist class in the USSR was split between those in consumer industries, and those in heavy industry-armaments. Nikita Khrushchev came to power in 1953, remaining as Prime Minister till 1964. Khrushchev resurrected capitalist relations, but stealthily as this was unpopular. Even by 2000: “hardly anyone calls it a “capitalist revolution”… for tactical reasons, intending to deceive the people”[1]. So the facade of ‘socialism’ was carefully maintained. [see WB Bland here and here]

Khrushchev instituted profit-based production, handing State Machine and Tractor Stations to collective farms. With Georgi Malenkov, they demanded more light industry at the Supreme Soviet:

“All the conditions exist for a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods… We must promote light industry by every means”.

Heavy industry state capitalists reversed this and removed Malenkov. In 1955 Marshal Bulganin, represented this faction. Khrushchev also sought “collaboration” with US imperialism in a utopian “partnership”. But by the 1960s the Soviet neo-capitalist class were smarting from the Cuban crisis and loss of influence in colonial-type countries. Consequently, the heavy industry section of the neo-capitalists class reversed the pro-USA collaboration. As the USSR disintegrated, these two sections of neo-capitalists battled each other [2]. Despite changes of leaders up to Putin, none challenged the role of profit.

Gorbachev to Yeltsin

Mikhail Gorbachev (General Secretary 1985), of the consumer industry faction, eroded central control. Repudiating the heavy industrialists, he withdrew USSR forces from Afghanistan which fomented a crisis. In 1985, Boris Yeltsin was appointed to the Politburo.

Meanwhile, living conditions deteriorated. Yeltsin pushed for un-mitigated capitalism. In 1990 his proposals for privatisation in a ‘programme for 500 days’ provoked an attempted coup, led by Vice-President Yanayev, arresting Gorbachev. Yeltsin simply occupied the Soviet’s ‘White House’ which ended the coup. Gorbachev resigned saying “My life’s work has been accomplished’. As Medvedev says:

“The new rulers of the Russian federation introduced a ‘revolution from above’, to transform the so-called socialist system of former Soviet Russia into a liberal capitalist system.”

The dissolution of the USSR in 1991, by agreement of Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine formed the ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS). Yeltsin, Gaidar and Chubais – removed price controls, urged on by US economist Jeffrey Sachs to:

“Introduce capitalism in one fell swoop to… dismantle quickly most of the controls and subsidies that had structured life for Soviet citizens for most of the century.”

They sold off the state, converting the economy into a comprador dependency on the USA, hitting heavy industrialists. Gaidar advised Russians to “simply shut our eyes tightly and leap into the unknown” – into ‘shock therapy’ [3]. Chaos ensued: Suicides, alcoholism and misery rose, life span shortened – reflecting decline:

“The national income declined by 18%… the indebtedness of enterprises came to 2.5 trillion rubles”.

Anatoly Chubais was empowered to “build capitalism in Russia in a few years of frontal assault… accomplishing production norms that had taken the rest of the world centuries.”

Supposedly all citizens received a voucher for “an equal share” of industrial enterprises, of ten thousand roubles. Under massive inflation that value fell dramatically. Moreover people were unpaid. Into this human misery, vultures swooped in buying vouchers at a pittance [4]. As the mayor of Moscow put it: “Privatisation was like a drunkard in the street selling his belongings for a pittance”.

This is how the oligarchy in Russia was created. It was exemplified by the oil and gas magnate Mikhail Khodorovsky whose power was broken by Putin.

Industrial output collapsed by 26 percent, Russia’s GDP fell 42 percent and industrial production fell 46 percent. Capital flight sent profits into Western banks. Savings of individual pensioners and families were wiped out. The Russian Academy of Sciences summed up 1992-1993:

“The income of the 10% of the Russia’s citizens most well-provided-for, was ten times higher than that of the least-well-provided for 10%. A third of the population has income below the official “subsistence minimum, and 10% or 15 million people are below the threshold of that necessary for physical survival. This signals the entry of society into severe social conflict”.

By October 1993, the Duma tried to impeach Yeltsin, who attacked the Supreme Soviet, killing at least 200. But while Yeltsin lost the Dumas elections, he won a referendum to alter the Constitution, and appointed a government. By 1994 more than 50 % of all productive capacity was in private hands, by 1995 80% of all state-owned enterprises had been sold.

Putin’s Role in This Theft From The Peoples of The USSR

Putin had been in the KGB in Dresden, as the GDR imploded. Likely in the GDR’s last days Putin helped move the Stasi’s cash into the West. Putin then returned to Russia. He emerged as a politician in St. Petersburg in 1994. He quickly gained positions there including controlling roles on financial committees. Putin became deputy to mayor Anatoly Sobchak.

The Joint Stock Commercial Bank Rossiya was established in 1990, through which enormous foreign cash transfers gutted the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). In 1991 Putin’s ‘Committee for Foreign Liaison’ coordinated the Bank’s activities, collaborating with organised criminal elements [5]. Putin aided Gennadiy Timchenko of Kirishi Petroleum Chemical Export, and Guvor, to gain contracts for food delivery in the ‘food crisis’ of 1991. However that ‘food purchase’ never arrived, the money stolen.

Putin protected Rossiya from investigations of money laundering to the West. As chairman of the Committee for Foreign Liaison he was responsible for encouraging, regulating, and licensing foreign investment in St. Petersburg. No monies left St Petersburg without his sanction. Putin aided the Tambow criminal gang and Gennadiy Petrov move monies out of Russia. By 2014 Rossiya bank was the 17th largest bank in Russia with over $10 billion in assets.

Putin made no communist expressions against fervent privatization. Instead Putin became part of the ‘Family’ gang of Boris Yeltsin. This included the financial oligarchy with Boris Berezovskiy for a long early period.

Putin surrounded himself with the Siloviki (‘strong men’ or ‘KGB Inc’) led by Igor Sechin. They resented selling Russia to the West, but equally they did not want to return to socialism. Instead they wanted to keep Russian capital for themselves Including for all its various misuses, for example helping Bashar al-Assad. As Putin’s former chief economics advisor Andrei Illarionov put it:

“Their ideology is the so-called ‘nash’-ism [ours-ism]… For ‘us’ common laws are not applicable. Another element of their corporatist state is the widespread use of force and violence in various forms towards opponents and ‘the others’.” [6]

Putin’s abuses were so blatant that legislators were zoning in on him. But the Commission led by legislator Marina Sal’ye was stalled by Putin. Sal’ye was ultimately forced into hiding. Numerous other documents and tied Putin into the gambling industry and simple but lucrative organised crime; real estate manipulations, fuel, commodities, etc.

Putin moved to Moscow as deputy head of Presidential Property Management Department (PPMD). In 1996 Yeltsin had seized control of all USSR and CPSU foreign property. Yeltsin used the PPMD to evade the Swiss-based company kickbacks scandal of Mabetex around the embezzlement of $62.5 million. Yeltsin’s fate now depended on Putin, who in 1997 became deputy chief of the presidential staff. By 1998 he was Director of the Federal Security Service (FSB), the KGB’s successor. By 1999 Putin was made acting Prime Minister by President Yeltsin, whose resignation led to Putin becoming Acting President.

By now the corruption trail was more vivid. Felipe Turover had turned over 4,000 pages of evidence to Swiss courts and Russian prosecutors detailing Mabatex. This came to the Russian Procurator General Yuiry Skuratov – from the Swiss prosecutor general Carla Del Ponte. ‘Yeltsin-gate’ fast became close to a ‘Putin-Gate’ – with Putin under charges of abuse of office. Suddenly a public exposure was made of pornographic videos showing Skuratov with two prostitutes, but Skuratov persisted.

The Moscow apartment bombings, a reputedly false flag operation, was their solution. First the Chechen wars were revived inside Dagestan by paid ‘militants’ planted by the FSB. But the apartment bombings ‘justified’ a Chechen war.

Cutting Teeth In Chechnya Seals Rise to Power

The Chechen Wars attacked an independent nation. General Dzhakhar Dudayev led the Chechen National Congress, as President in October 1991. Yeltin sent in Russian troops, who stood down when surrounded by Chechen troops.

The Russian state engineered factions in Ingushetia to demand an Ingush Republic. By 1993 Chechnya was bitterly divided. By November 1994, as historian Dunlop says “the Yeltsin leadership had arrived at a firm decision to overthrow Dudaev in a “black operation” [7]. In December 1994, an invasion led to “Russia’s biggest military operation since Afghanistan” [8]. Fierce Chechen resistance, and Russian army morale disintegration – led to massive discontent inside Russia. The invasion of 1 January 1995 was fought to a standstill by Chechens.

But this victory was temporary. At stake were, firstly oil pipelines from Baku, Azerbaijian to link on to the Black Sea.

Secondly, it was necessary to ensure Putin’s leadership, to stop the impeachment of Yeltsin, since Putin’s neck was also on the line.

The path was to be internal subterfuge [9]:

“Sergei Yushenkov, chairman of Defense Committee, telephoned Oleg Lobov, secretary of Russian Security Council.
Lobov told him there would be a war… (saying): ‘It is not only a question of the integrity of Russia. We need a small victorious war to raise the president’s ratings.’”

To make this “acceptable” to a reluctant Russian people, false flag terror operations were launched to ‘justify’ emergency powers. Warnings emerged in June 1999, of “the preparation of a series of terrorist acts in Russia (aiming at) canceling the future elections”, and “to be blamed on the Chechens.” The market town explosion of Vladikavkaz, North Ossetiya (March 1999) killed seventy.

The Yeltsin Family knew the planned events as the “Storm in Moscow”, which aimed to:

“discredit [mayor] Luzhkov with provocations, to destabilize the socio-psychological situation in Moscow. … (with) loud terrorist acts ..:… (and) kidnapping of… well-known people and average citizens by ‘Chechen rebels’ who with great pomp will then be ‘freed’”.

Helicopter gunships shot up the Caucasus “to create an excuse for cancelling upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections”. The oligarch Boris Berezovski (then close to Yeltsin and Putin) funded “extremist elements among Chechen separatists with millions of dollars.” Putin’s involvement extended to planning with the former Prime Minister Stashin, to bring “the international terrorist Shamil Basaev” into a campaign into Dagestan.”

Stepashin was candid to ‘Frankfurter Rundschau’ in 2000. They planned “to destabilize the situation “to permit Yeltsin to declare Emergency Rule in Russia and to postpone the parliamentary and presidential elections of December 1999 and March 2000.” Two subsequent explosions in September 1999 in Moscow led to about 224 people and innumerable casualties. Duly, Vladimir Putin became acting Russian president three-and-a-half months after the Moscow bombings.

After Putin turned on Berezovskii and forced him into exile, Berezovskii revealed ‘Operation Successor’:

“these explosions [in Moscow] were the work not of Chechens but of the Russian authorities.”

Putin – in his autobiography conceded:

“he had “to a large degree” taken responsibility for the entire (Chechen) war effort.”

Conclusion

No leftist can harbour illusions about Putin, who said:

“the Bolsheviks “destroyed what glues, molds the people of civilized countries – market relationships. They destroyed the market emerging capitalism. The only thing that they did to keep the country together within common borders – was a barb wire.”

Putin regained the lucrative oil and gas industries for Russian capital, destroying oligarch-compradors for foreign capitalists, especially Khodorkovsky. Lately, Alexei Navalny was targeted for revealing Putin’s hidden wealth. For example, The Kremlin claims that Putin earns $140,000/year. His publicly disclosed assets include an 800-square foot apartment, a trailer, and three cars. But according to some experts, he may be the one of the wealthiest men in the world with assets totaling up to $200 billion.

In light of this, it is clear that Russia under Putin is a hyper-nationalist neo-imperialist state while Putin himself is an oligarch and a ruthless imperialist, not “an anti-fascist”. It is not enough to replace one imperialist with its rival, one has to oppose the structures of power itself: at home, in the USA, and also in Russia.

References:

[1]. Roy Medvedev, “Post-Soviet Russia. A Journey through the Yeltsin era”; New York; 2000; p. 47

[2]. Christian Schmidt-Hauer, ‘Gorbachev – Path to power’; London 1986; p. 130.

[3]. Medvedev; Ibid p.14; 23; 43; 88-90;

[4]. Catherine Belton, ‘Putin’s People’; New York; 2020;p.76; 33-34

[5]. Karen Dawisha, ‘Putin’s Kleptocracy’; New York; 2014 p.63-70; p.80-83; 190-200

[6]. Martin Sixsmith, “Putin’s Oil. The Yukos Affair and the Struggle for Russia”; London 2010;p.55

[7]. Dunlop John 1, ‘Russia Confronts Chechnya’; Cambridge, 1998; p.193-197

[8]. ‘The Guardian’, 3 December 1994.

[9]. Dunlop, John2,’ Moscow Bombings of September 1999: Russian Terrorist Attacks at the Onset of Putin`s Rule., Ibidem Verlag, 2015. p.14-76

France: Mélenchon, Macron, Zemmour and the Future of the Left

“Macron suddenly stopped shaving and started wearing military sweatshirts” Interview with Paris-based socialist John Mullen

The Left Berlin
02/04/2022

As the election campaign continues through April, what is the atmosphere on the radical left in France?

JM : This is a long electoral season, with two rounds of presidential elections in April, and two rounds of parliamentary elections in June. The two are very much linked, because the electorate is traditionally generous to whoever wins the presidentials. On the left, some political positioning in April is decided with possible alliances for June in mind.

In 35 years as an activist in France, I have never seen a radical left programme so visible or an electoral campaign so exciting. The campaign of Jean-Luc Mélenchon got at least 60,000 people on the streets of Paris in a demonstration mid-March. The YouTube Channel has 800,000 subscribers and Mélenchon or other ‘France Insoumise’ Members of Parliament are on prime-time TV most days. Mélenchon’s mass meetings are real moments of mass political education and get tens of thousands to attend. This is far more than any other candidate. Next week the meeting will be simultaneous in 12 towns, with the help of 11 holograms of Mélenchon! The message is very simple. The money exists to increase wages and pensions enormously, make energy and agriculture green, and abolish homelessness. Let’s change society and tax the rich, instead of scapegoating Muslims and Arabs! [you can read an analysis of Mélenchon’s programme in English here]

Because of the tremendous combativeness and political consciousness of millions of French workers over recent years, left reformism has been able to re-emerge. This has happened outside the traditional parties of the left, which are now marginalized, and with a dynamic, insurgent tone.

Russia’s invasion in Ukraine and the subsequent actions of the so-called “West” (sanctions, rise of militarism, much talk about “Europe’s place in the world” etc.) are reshaping the political terrain. Can you talk about the impact in France?

JM: A warmongering atmosphere always helps the government in place, since they are in a position to “do something”, or at least appear to do so. Also, right-wing demands for more military spending are harder to oppose in a confusing war atmosphere. Macron has tried to profit from all this in an almost caricatural manner. He suddenly stopped shaving and started wearing military sweatshirts hoping to look more like Zelenskyy in a photoshoot! He quickly rose five per cent in the opinion polls, but seems to be losing some of that gain now, and is adapting his tactics day by day to suit.

Mélenchon has stood out in opposing NATO escalation. This led to a major campaign led by Socialist Party candidate Anne Hidalgo (who has two per cent in the polls) to smear him as a friend of Putin’s. Although millions probably believed this nonsense, Mélenchon’s anti-war stand won him some support too, in a polarizing atmosphere, and he has gained a couple of percentage points.

Macron seems to be the favourite. Can you describe – politically, socially – the core of his electoral support? Do you think there could be an upset in the second round and, if not – what should we expect to see during his new term?

JM: There are around 48 million adults in France. In the 2017 elections Macron got eight and a half million votes in the first round, and won the second round easily against Marine Le Pen, as many millions voted for him just to keep the fascists out. So it is not that he is popular, but that he is more popular than others in a very fragmented political landscape. Macron’s voters tend to be older and he is very popular among managerial staff. And these groups do not generally abstain.

Macron built his party on the ruins of the traditional left and right, filling it with right-wing opportunists and left-wing traitors, but the party has little presence on the ground. Only a handful of towns have a mayor from La Republique en Marche, his party.

Partly because he is outside the traditional parties of the right, he has been able to do a couple of things to make him look socially concerned or “centre-right”. For example, class sizes have been much reduced in schools in the poorest towns; heavy elitist policies in top universities have been changed; and help for wage workers during the pandemic was better than in neighbouring countries.

Certainly Macron has a strong hand for re-election. He wanted to be France’s Thatcher, but in fact has only managed to carry out half of his planned attacks. Vicious attacks on the unemployed, in education and against local government were pushed through; with gradually more islamophobia and violent repression; and big tax cuts for the rich. But his flagship plan was to smash the French pension scheme, was defeated by mass strikes and demonstrations of millions. In his campaign for re-election, he says he will try again to attack pensions, and promises to build nuclear power stations. He also hints at other attacks – like making students pay much more to go to university (at present they pay only a few hundred euros a year). The billions of Euros which were spent on the pandemic will encourage him to push even harsher austerity, and there will be huge fightbacks. Already some quite solid strikes for wages have been taking place.

It has been some months since the initial rise of Zemmour in the polls and the commentary about the explaining the emergence of this new trend. What more do we know about the realignment of the French far-right today? Is he simply splitting a part of FN’s electoral support or bringing in additional forces to the far-right? How are both of them (Le Pen and Zemmour) doing in terms of building their forces on the ground?

JM: Zemmour is reacting to the long and relatively successful campaign by Marine Le Pen to give her Party a respectable image. He demands a “ministry of remigration” and aims to throw Blacks and Arabs out of the country. After a police murder in the Paris suburbs a few days back, he trumpeted his support for the murderer, saying “we must eradicate this scum”. He defends the record of the French fascist Vichy regime, claiming they defended French Jews! It is extremely worrying that he managed to get 30,000 people to a national rally in Paris at the end of March.

Both Le Pen and Zemmour are very weak from the point of view of local party organization on the ground. In the 2020 local elections, Le Pen’s Party scored 2.3%. In many towns they dare not organize public meetings or leafletting, and fascist demonstrations have been very rare in recent years. Their main effect, so far, through electoral pressure, has been to push official politics rightwards and ensure that Macron launch a series of attacks on Muslims and on free speech. So Macron has been banning Muslim and pro Palestine organizations and now has probably the most violent police force in Western Europe.

A lot has been written about the weak state of the left. Disunity (in the ranks of “the left of the left”) was obviously a factor in these elections, but I am guessing that there are also issues that run deeper than that, of the type that cannot be solved during an election. So, what are the main challenges that the main currents of the “left of the left” (LFI, PCF, NPA) should address the coming period, after the election is over?

JM: The recent tactics of the reformist French Communist Party and of the New Anti-capitalist Party have been moulded by the two main characteristics of the period. First the staggering collapse of the Socialist Party who held the presidency and the government till 2017 and now stand at 2% in the polls. And secondly the emergence of the France Insoumise as a mass movement, gaining 7 million votes in 2017.

The Communist Party had supported Mélenchon’s candidacy for President in 2017, but put its own man up this time, Fabien Roussel. Roussel’s campaign made a very clear shift rightwards to distinguish themselves from Mélenchon. Roussel made plenty of noise about his support for nuclear power; attended a reactionary police officers union rally; and emphasised his closeness to well known left islamophobes. He declared that Mélenchon does not speak to the “real” French people but only to “the radicalized population of some outer suburbs”. This has been widely interpreted as code words for black and Arab young people. Roussel also trumpets the importance of “traditional” French food and wine, in a coded attack on multiculturalism. His aim to distinguish himself from Mélenchon is also linked to future legislative and other elections. In 2021 regional elections, the PCF allied itself with the social liberal Socialist Party in 9 of the 13 regions.

The New Anticapitalist Party (NPA) has, in my view, not grasped the significance of the resurgence of radical left reformism, and that is why they have run their own candidate for president, Philippe Poutou (at 1% in the polls). They assumed the France Insoumise (FI) would disappear after the elections of 2017. Their newspaper and leaflets say almost nothing about the France Insoumise campaign, and they have not attempted to debate with the FI movement, mostly limiting themselves to abstract denunciations of reformism. “If Mélenchon is elected”, said one of their leaders, Olivier Besancenot, “his [radical] broom will be transformed into a feather duster and he will just end up dusting the furniture in the Elysées Palace”.

Now, a broad and crucially important conversation is going on about radical reform and its limits, in France. Mélenchon recently produced a video with Stathis Kouvélakis about how to avoid a failure like Syriza’s in Greece; and two lectures about the 1981 radical left Mitterrand government in France and its limits. Marxists will have many serious disagreements with what Mélenchon says – but boycotting this debate, which involves twenty times more people than ten years ago – is a grave mistake.

For most people, Poutou’s campaign – which lists radical reforms as Mélenchon’s does – is difficult to distinguish from that of the France Insoumise. Mélenchon says “citizens’ revolution”, Poutou says “break with capitalism”. I do not want to sound like a red professor, giving bad grades to the NPA, an organization of determined class fighters, but critical support for Mélenchon would have allowed immeasurably more Marxist input. Some smaller revolutionary organizations [such as Révolution] work inside the France Insoumise, and, as the latter is a movement not a party, this is relatively easy to do.

The election campaign sees an enormous amount of debate and argument, which is an excellent thing. The France Insoumise has launched mass door to door campaigning, which is not a common tradition in France. As I write, Mélenchon is around 14.5% in the polls. It is not impossible for him to go through to the second round, which would be a political earthquake, a massive blow to the far right, and a boost to everyone on the left. It would mean that between the two rounds, radical change would be the focus of every political conversation. If the second round is again “a duet and not a duel” between Macron and Le Pen, the France Insoumise will nevertheless remain central to the radical Left. Building its influence, persuading its members to prioritize non-electoral struggles too, while maintaining a fraternal, independent, Marxist voice, is the main task for anti-capitalists.

One of Mélenchon’s spokespeople, Manuel Bompard, tweeted this week “We are not asking anyone to vote for us and then go quietly back home! We call on people to vote and then to continue to mobilize! We need a society which is boiling over! That is how we will finally succeed!” Anti-capitalists and Marxists can only be delighted to support this approach, for all our criticisms.

John Mullen is an anti-capitalist activist living in the Paris region. His political website is here. This interview was carried out by Panos Petrou for Rproject, Greece