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Brazil 2022 elections: Part 1 – How did we get here?

The rise of Bolsonaro is partly down to mistakes made by the Left in government, argues Brazilan socialist Bernardo Jurema. First of a Two Part article


01/10/2022

The first round of the Brazilian elections will be held on October 2, 2022. 156 million Brazilians will vote to choose representatives for state legislatures, both houses of Congress, state governors and the presidency. Over the last months, opinion polls show a polarization between the incumbent far-right Jair Bolsonaro (with around 31 percent) and the center-left former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (at about 48 percent). Despite several attempts to prop up a “third way” alternative, no other candidate has gone past one digit figures. In order to win outright in the first round, Lula needs 50 percent plus 1 of valid votes (excluding blank and null votes), otherwise the first- and second-place candidates face off in the second round.

An analysis of respectable, recent Ipec polls, by journalist José Roberto de Toledo, between December 2021 to August 2022, Lula went from 49 percent to 44 percent, while Bolsonaro shot up from 22 percent to 32 percent, and the total sum of all of Lula’s adversaries combined went from 38 percent to 44 percent. Toledo added that in this period, Bolsonaro has grown across all social segments and in all regions.

To understand this trend, look at how the two candidates acted in the past eight months. Lula has pandered to the right… To be more precise, he has pandered to a very specific and tiny, albeit influential, constituency: Brazil’s financial sector. This is illustrated by his vice presidential pick, former São Paulo governor and the darling of ‘Faria Lima‘ (Brazil’s Wall Street) Geraldo Alckmin. In May, Lula said “we don’t discuss economic policies before winning the elections. First, you have to win the elections. And then you have to know who you will have in your team and what you will do.” Lula has made no promises on the economy, except for the pledge to increase the minimum wage above inflation.

Bolsonaro’s record

This is nothing short of appalling. Under his watch, “Brazil has recorded 34.5 million Covid-19 cases, the third highest in the world, and 685,000 deaths, the second highest after the U.S. […] with the president’s denialism obstructing the state from effectively combating the pandemic”. Those figures are likely underestimated.

Deforestation of the Amazon forest exploded, illegal mining hit a record high (a territory the size of Taiwan has been deforested since he took power in 2019). Bolsanaro’s expected defeat led to intensified destruction in the forest by illegal loggers, cattle ranchers and gold miners. Incidences of abuse of Brazil’s indigenous tribes have risen sharply under Bolsonaro, as illegal gold miners flocked to the supposedly protected reserves. His administration “attacked Brazilian indigenous communities in every possible way”.

He presided over weakening of the country’s democratic institutions by constant threats of military intervention. Bolsonaro’s finance minister Paulo Guedes, a University of Chicago graduate, led a “free market, pro-business agenda” focused “on cutting bureaucracy, promoting privatisation and simplifying labour regulations” that led to a “widespread decline in quality of life”, says the Financial Times.

About 27 million Brazilians now live below the poverty line, the most since the start of records 10 years ago. Some 125.2 million people (58.7%) are food insecure, while 33 million (15%) go hungry every day. Bolsonaro has been a disaster across the board, amounting to a human rights crisis and a threat to democracy. None of this came as a surprise to anyone paying attention. Before being elected president, he had a long, well recorded history of racist, misogynistic, hateful statements and positions over 30 years in Congress.

Facing such a dire scenario, one cannot help but struggle to understand how this government can keep the solid support of one third of voters. Rio-based philosopher Rodrigo Nunes provides a compelling explanation: “In the face of this psychic suffering that is produced by the structural impossibility of realizing one of the most widespread beliefs in our society (that anyone can be their own boss, of meritocracy and of working with what they dream of), what the extreme right does is to say “you failed”. But “It’s not your fault, it’s the fault of Workers’ Party (PT) for stealing; of the artists who let themselves be bought by the Rouanet Law (a tax incentive policy for arts and culture); of the poor who were bought by the income transfer policies”.

Bolsonarismo, did not come out of the blue. It is a symptom of deep-seated problems in Brazilian society. These problems came to the fore in the wave of protests sweeping Brazil between June 2013 and the 2014 World Cup, with demonstrations, school occupations, shopping mall protests, garbage collectors’ wildcat strike in Rio, and so on,  across the country. Nunes argues that this was the most significant mass political fact since the re-democratization protests of the early 1980s. Nunes said, “The potential that existed there was much greater than all the subsequent developments, and it was not exhausted in any of them.”

This cycle of protests should be understood in the global context – alongside Occupy, Indignados, Arab Spring, Turkey’s Gezi Park, and so on. It was a diffuse uprising against the political system that on so many levels had failed many societal sectors. The insurgents/protesters broadly demanded better public services like healthcare, education, transit, housing.

The Dilma Rousseff government was caught off guard and was unable to address the protesters’ demands. Protesters were instead met with police brutality and media demonization. Because, as Nunes puts it, “the first Dilma government from the beginning had been alienating its natural political base, especially among younger people”.

The Workers Party (PT) in Office

Let’s assess the 14 years (2003-16) of the PT in power in order to understand how we got here. It was under the nominally leftist government of the PT that mega dam projects in the Amazon forest were built with devastating ecological and social consequences. Brazil’s prison population skyrocketed. An anti-terrorist bill that criminalized protests was approved and the Law and Order Guarantee decree, authorizing the deployment of army troops to a low-income neighborhood in Rio – was signed. This is far from an exhaustive list.

Between 2003 and 2012, 560 indigenous people were murdered in Brazil, an average of 56 per year – an increase of 168.3 percent compared to the average during the tenure of Lula’s predecessor, center-right Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002). According to Ermínia Maricato, one of Brazil’s most renowned urban planners and activists who worked in Lula’s government, the PT’s housing policy was a boon to the contractors, real estate developers and land owners. Meanwhile it “worsened the cities, aggravated the difficulties of access to housing among the poorest and created neighborhoods especially vulnerable to organized crime”.

A recent study published in the Revista Brasileira de Estudos e Defesa (Brazilian Journal of Defense Studies) found that the PT governments led the further militarization of the Ministry of Defense. “If we had built the necessary institutions for civilian control at that time, when this was possible politically speaking, today we probably wouldn’t have the absurdities that we see on a daily basis: too many military personnel in the government, too many benefits and excessive salaries.”

“All of this is related to the fact that we didn’t do our homework during a more progressive government,” said one of the co-authors, Juliano Cortinhas (Universidade de Brasília). In 2013, one newspaper article observed that “In Brazil, the homosexual issue moves at a slow pace”. One study found that in 2017, one year after the PT left office, violent deaths of LGBTQ people had reached an all time high. Things have only worsened since then.

Some recent research even questions the PT’s trademark achievement: the reduction of inequality. Upon closer inspection, it turns out that during the PT’s tenure “concentration of income in the hands of the richest actually increased”. One study “found that while the least wealthy 50 per cent of Brazilians increased their share of national income from 13 per cent to 14 per cent between 2001 and 2015, those in the top 10 per cent also grew their share – from 54 per cent to 55 per cent – and of course this share was substantially bigger to begin with.”

Marcelo Medeiros, visiting professor at Columbia University and one of Brazil’s most respected experts on inequality, noted, “Our policies to reduce inequality need to be revised. There are new players in the game, and they are heavy players, like wealth, inheritances, profits and capital gains … A very large part of inequality in Brazil will not be affected by anything that affects the labour market – such as education. That doesn’t affect taxation or inheritance.”

The PT’s legacy

There has been no reckoning with the Left’s experience in power. Lula’s approach of social-democratic conciliation has not been critically debated either within the PT or the broader Brazilian Left. Instead, Lula continues to play the game – a very rotten game – of Brazilian politics. He continues business as usual, preferring to build support within the country’s political and economic establishment, rather than the more arduous, but perhaps more sustainable work of building social support.

As pointed out, in 2002, Lula was elected president for the first time, with the backing of five parties and the PT controlled 19 of the 34 ministerial positions. Four years later on re-election, Lula had three parties in his coalition and the PT controlled 16 out of 36 ministerial positions. This year, Lula’s coalition is composed of 10 parties, including many who opposed the PT their whole political lives.

The best example is Lula’s VP pick. Geraldo Alckmin is a socially conservative, pro-police, anti-labour, neo-liberal former governor of São Paulo state, closely aligned with Brazil’s financial elite and the political godfather of notorious former Bolsonaro environment minister Ricardo Salles.

The risk of relying on Brazil’s political system is that it is not very reliable. Out of the 13 coalition parties that helped Rousseff get re-elected by a tiny margin in 2014, most including the largest ones, voted for her impeachment, while a couple smaller ones though divided, sided towards impeachment (Data here in Portuguese). Only her own party, the PT, and a small center-left party, voted against impeachment.

This illustrates the point. The fact that there has been no reckoning of the PT or Brazil’s left generally with the 14 years of the left in power means that lessons have not been learnt, and hence the same political approaches are doomed to be repeated.

Michel Temer, who took over after Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment (however spurious the grounds on which it was carried out), was her vice-president. At least 11 of Temer’s 24 ministers had been under investigation for participating in various capacities in the Petrobras corruption scheme that took place during the PT years. Some of them had been ministers or held key positions in the previous PT governments.

In fact, Temer’s finance minister, Henrique Meirelles, had been the president of Brazil’s Central Bank during both of Lula’s tenures (and before he had been President and COO of BankBoston worldwide). It was under Meirelles’ tenure as finance minister that the infamous spending cap to limit public spending to the inflation rate, “at the heart of President Michel Temer’s austerity plan”, was approved. It severely hindered any serious social spending.

Two weeks before the first round of the upcoming elections, Meirelles appeared alongside seven other former presidential candidates in past elections to show support for Lula. As one news report noted, “Meirelles’ presence is also a nod to the financial market and the business community, which has been in contact with the PT campaign, and raises speculation about the possible presence of the former minister in a future Lula government”.

This highlights that the problems and shortcomings of the experience of the Left in power in Brazil, stemmed not from being too radical, but, on the contrary, for accommodating Brazil’s political and economic establishment. As one on-line commentator has eloquently put it: “The ‘polarization’ equivalent of Bolsonarismo would be an outspoken supporter of the Shining Path with a real chance of coming to power through the ballot box. What we have is a completely bizarre right-wing turn of the Overton Window. Where fascio-liberalism has been normalized into the landscape and a center-right social-liberalism is seen as ‘left-wing extremism’.”

Most of Brazil’s Left and social movements have unconditionally adhered to Lula’s campaign. This has increased in the weeks prior to the first round vote amid intensifying calls for the so-called “useful vote“. Such calls, stemming from various societal sectors, urge Brazilians to vote for Lula in the first round in order to finish this off quickly. One independent journalist, voicing this position cautioned, “After the election, the matter is different: we will demand a better Brazil. Today’s vote does not mean automatic alignment tomorrow”. Others who support Lula, seek to extract guarantees – the business and financial sectors, for instance. One journalist wrote, “In the final stretch of the campaign before the first round of voting, different market and business sectors have intensified conversations with Lula’s (PT) headquarters in search of definitions or signals for a possible ministry of the Economy – should Lula be elected”.

As Carlos Eduardo Martins, Professor of Political Science at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), eloquently puts it: “A univocal position of the left in support of this path impoverishes it enormously, does not reflect its diversity and obscures its potential in the design of alternatives to the dramatic scenario in which Brazil finds itself. The problem of fascism in our country goes far beyond Bolsonaro, it is deeply linked to the excluding dynamics of our liberalism and to the place Brazil occupies in world geopolitics.”

To be continued after the election…

“Germany can’t just put its head in the sand because of the Holocaust.”

Interview with Wieland Hoban, chair of Jüdische Stimme für gerechten Frieden in Nahost

Interview with Wieland Hoban, chair of Jüdische Stimme für gerechten Frieden in Nahost

 

Ali Khan (AK): First of all, thank you for giving us your time today. I‘ll start by asking you about yourself, the organization, and your involvement in it.

Wieland Hoban (WH): I’m a composer and academic translator. It’s only over the last few years that I’ve really become involved in explicit activism. The Palestinian cause has been very important to me for many years, but I suppose I didn’t feel able to really get involved in the activism.

Especially in Germany, the Jewish population is so small and there’s nothing comparable to the kind of Jewish opposition to Zionism and Israeli policy that exists in the US or even in the UK. There is an even stronger assumption that Jews are on the side of Israel, and often those who aren’t are reluctant to get involved in activism because they feel under pressure to distance themselves from Israel and they easily feel attacked themselves.

I think Jewish people are often in a kind of bind in which they are forced to take sides. Their communities may be very pro-Israel, but their political outlook and identity might actually go against that.

I thought that this cause of Jewish pro-Palestinian activism was especially worth supporting. It’s also a better outlet for the Jewish identity of being an anti-Zionist, because in a lot of Jewish spaces that’s an unpopular position to have.

AK: What is the composition of your organization? And could you tell me a little bit about your own Jewish background? How has that inspired you in this direction?

WH: Our organization has existed since 2003, and in 2007 became a registered society. We’ve gotten some attacks from the mainstream, including Jewish organizations. We were awarded a peace prize by the city of Göttingen in 2019, and there was some protest because it was known that we support BDS. Fortunately, the jury stood firm. And even though the city and the university actually tried to prevent the prize ceremony in a university hall, fortunately, an alternative space was found.

I didn’t grow up with any strong sense of Jewishness. There was nothing religious about my upbringing. My father was American and, as a very young man, he had volunteered to join the US army in the Second World War when he heard what was happening to the Jews. Because, as he put it, he wanted to defend his people. This sense of tribal allegiance was something familiar to me, but not so much on my own part.

He didn’t observe any sort of rituals or traditions; his own parents were secular. The strongest, or the most obvious Jewish part of their identity was that Yiddish was their first language. They didn’t pass that on to him because I think they wanted him to be just an American without the baggage of being the foreigner – they had come from the Russian Empire (now Ukraine). In my twenties, when I was first became interested in exploring Jewish thought and culture a bit more, something that really got in the way of that was this strong association of all things Jewish with Israel.

That was around the same time that I was started feeling strongly about the Palestinian issue. Unfortunately, I couldn’t find a way really to reconcile this Jewish element with my political position. You might say I allowed Zionism to spoil Jewishness for me, something that unfortunately lasted for many years.

The work of Jewish groups (like our own), such as Jewish Voice for Labour in the UK, and of course Jewish Voice for Peace in the US, inspired me and made me see that there was a way to combine a Palestinian, anti-Zionist position without having to leave behind or be alienated from Jewishness. Thiscreated a stronger sense of Jewishness in me and showed me a way to overcome that alienation.

AK: Your organisation’s complaint specifically targeted Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz, who are considered to be on the liberal spectrum. These politicians are defined by their opposition to Bibi Netanyahu. Tell us what motivated you to target these two people and not Naftali Bennett, for example, and his right-wing party.

WH: First off, I should say that these classifications of left and right might apply to domestic policies in Israel, but when it comes to the oppression of Palestinians, everyone is the same, regardless if they’re so-called liberals or hardliners.

Back in 2014, during the carnage of Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, Benny Gantz was Chief of Staff in the army. He was directly responsible for the bombing and the massacres there. Not long after that, during his own election campaign, he actually boasted about his anti-Palestinian credentials by saying that he had bombed Gaza back to the stone age.

Lapid has only recently come to enjoy this level of power. Accordingly, he hasn’t been directly involved in crimes against Palestinians for so long, but he was Prime Minister when the latest attacks on Gaza occurred in August.

More immediately, he was very recently in Germany visiting so soon after the attacks on Gaza, that we felt that it just highlighted the hypocrisy. Especially if you consider that a month or so previously, Mahmoud Abbas made this embarrassing and tasteless gaffe in his speech in Berlin where he spoke about 50 Holocausts. He was just slammed for that in a way that no Israeli politician would ever be slammed for killing Palestinians. In Germany, it was the greater offense to go against “Holocaust etiquette” than actually to kill people. So, we felt it would be an important way of drawing attention to this to say that Lapid is actually a criminal and that Gantz is one of the greatest war criminals in Israel.

We know that a complaint like this isn’t going to land them in jail, but we wanted this to be a reminder of what these people are and issue a statement against normalising relations with them.

AK: The Abbas incident was in response to a question about the Munich massacre. No journalist would ever ask an Israeli politician about any massacre and say, “Apologize.”

WH: That’s exactly why Abbas got worked up about it. If he had just refrained from the last bit of his statement, from using the word “holocausts,” then it would’ve been a reasonable statement. He’s saying, “You always expect us to condemn this or apologize for that, but what about all the massacres that have been perpetrated against Palestinians?” It’s an important point to make, but then he blew it with his choice of words – any and everything became about the Holocaust then.

AK: The use of the word Holocaust offended German sensibility more than anything.

WH: Correct. In fact, even the National Commissioner for fighting antisemitism, Felix Klein, commented that Abbas had been inconsiderate towards his host – i.e., not that it had been offensive to victims of the Holocaust, but rather to Germans. I thought that was just a remarkable, accidentally honest confession and expression of how much the Holocaust is part of German identity politics.

AK: Yair Lapid was at the UN General Assembly this month explicitly promoting a two-state solution with a peaceful Palestinian state, with the caveat that Israel will allow it – but it has to be to Israel’s taste. What is your organization’s views of a just peace (as stated in its name)?

WH: If I had to choose between justice and peace for the name, then I would opt for justice. There’s this old slogan that became more widely known with the George Floyd protests: “No justice, no peace.” Peace isn’t just when the oppressed submit or when they stop complaining, which is really what Israel’s expectation is. “If the Palestinians just shut up and stop making trouble, then it’ll be peaceful.” But the reason for the non-peace is the injustice.

These expectations are always asymmetrical. They want a demilitarized Palestinian state ­– one expects them to make do with some sort of pseudo-sovereignty that wouldn’t be expected of any state. Palestine is expected to be grateful for this. As subalterns, it’s all they can really aspire to.

We reject that. Our principle is that every person in historic Palestine – the territory controlled by Israel, regardless of whether it officially belongs to the state or not – should be equal, both in terms of human and electoral rights. Only a situation in which everybody is equal can be considered a just solution. Any so-called peace that isn’t based on justice is not peace; it’s just a sham, an arrangement, a lull in conflict.

AK: There’s a need for restitution as well.

WH: One of the crucial points is the right of return: Palestinians who have made their lives in different countries and who have substantial Palestinian communities – whether in the US or in Europe – are not going to suddenly move to Palestine.

The same rights any Jew in the world has to come to Israel and become a citizen in a fast track process with a lot of perks is what Palestinians need as well. They also need to be given a nice subsidized apartment in the West Bank, for example, or in Israel (but in the West Bank it’s cheaper). That’s considered reasonable based on the idea that that thousands of years ago Jews somehow came from there. But when you have Palestinians whose parents and grandparents still have the keys of houses that they lived in, we’re talking about a literal family connection still within living memory, not some distant quasi-mythological connection. The fact that the Jews would have that right, but not Palestinians, is already a form of apartheid.

AK: What kind of response has your activism generated within the media?

WH: There has been an international response and a number of articles. I also did a live interview for Al-Jazeera. In Germany I did an interview with one leftist paper, Junge Welt; we have a connection to them. They’ve often written about us. I’m sure plenty of people have seen it – we’re pretty active on Twitter and have plenty of followers, so that information is circulated. Germans mostly didn’t want to give the story any oxygen, so they avoided it.

AK: Is that the primary strategy: to deprive any Jewish group of oxygen rather than attack them directly?

WH: You get both. On platforms like Twitter, there are plenty of people who are happy to attack us and even call us anti-Semitic. As far as the wider discourse goes, I think people try to ignore us because quite often they don’t know what to do with Jewish anti-Zionists. The majority of our members have an Israeli background.

No one can say to them, “You don’t know anything about Israel.” Now I’ve been seeing the argument that most of us didn’t grow up in Germany, so we are not able to speak about anti-Semitism here.

A relatively small part of our members actually did grow up in Germany, but many have lived here for decades, or they have children who were born here. Clearly, it’s absurd to try to somehow invalidate our position by saying we’re not German enough. They can’t say, “You don’t know enough about Israel,” so instead they say, “You’re not German enough” to comment on the anti-Semitism discourse here. The hostile actors who engage with us just try to delegitimise our position by saying, “These people support BDS.” The idea is that clearly one can’t talk to such people, the same way one wouldn’t talk to neo-Nazis at a public discussion.

AK: The AfD presented a resolution declaring BDS to be antisemitic, while they have Nazi Holocaust denialists within their movement, not to mention a general rise in extra-parliamentary far-right violence. What do you think of the effects of these associations between anti-Palestinian, pro-Israel discourses and the far-right on Jewish life?

We’ve seen now in a variety of places how supporting Israel and the Zionist project is perfectly compatible with being on the far right. What we see today in Israel is far-right politics. Jewish and European nationalists – Viktor Orban in Hungary is a particularly clear example – have the common enemy of Muslims, Arabs – basically non-white people.

Whether or not he likes Jews is not so important because this is realpolitik. Netanyahu was always very happy to take the money of Christian Zionists, who cling to this anti-Semitic fantasy of the Messiah returning and requiring all Jews either to convert or be damned or killed. Obviously, Netanyahu is not interested in their bizarre beliefs. If they’re giving money and advocacy, then he’s happy to take that.

The AfD know that in Germany, it goes down well in the political mainstream to seem pro-Jewish. At the same time, they also feel an affinity with Israeli nationalism simply because they’re nationalists. Again, they have the shared enemy of Muslims and PoCs.

This is the political level. At street level, the neo-Nazis who go out marching are certainly not trying to seem pro-Jewish. They’ll be happy to beat up any Jews or to say that Jews have too much control and should therefore be contained or eliminated.

AK: It’s like a lot of these white nationalists just want to deport Jewish people into Israel. That’s almost their fantasy.

That’s also the sense in which Zionism is an internalization of anti-Semitic logic because it’s based on the idea that Jews really belong in Israel. It was undoing this long struggle for assimilation, recognition, and equality that Jews had gone through in Europe.

Whenever I have the opportunity to talk about the history of both Zionism and anti-Zionism, I highlight the way in which it’s just doing the anti-Semites a favor. It’s like people saying to immigrants, as they often do, “If you don’t like it here, then why don’t you go back where you came from.”

In earlier centuries, when people were more defined by religion, religious Jews could be treated as a foreign barbaric culture, in the same way that Muslims still are in some places. Once Jews had become accepted a part of mainstream society, they still occupied an in-between role. This is something that you see in far-right ideologies: the idea that Jews look like they belong to us, to the white race, but they actually don’t. They’re going to bring in all these dark-skinned people through immigration in order to destroy the white race.

On the left, plenty of Jews have a more diasporist view, and say that Jewish self-determination is not about founding a state with Jewish sovereignty but just about being part of our societies wherever we live. Similarly, they advocate joining in the struggle against discrimination towards all minorities, rather than seeking to be a majority with power. That, for me, is the alternative to Jewish nationalism.

AK: The “rootless cosmopolitanism” slur?

Yes, but in the 19th century, when European societies were less racially diverse, this sense of color and ethnicity was  different from what it is today. Today, I’d speak of a kind of conditional whiteness, in the sense that we aren’t harassed by the police in the same way that Black or visibly Muslim people are. At the same time, white supremacists are also going to view us as some of the people they want to get rid of.

AK: What is your advice on the strategies to pressure the state of Israel to help move this peace forward? What would you suggest the reader of this interview do in their locale, but particularly in Germany?

It’s important for white Jews to recognize that we do have the privilege of whiteness at the same time as being a minority, and that these kinds of privilege are contextual and conditional. Something that often causes tension between Jewish and PoC communities are competing claims about levels of discrimination and oppression.

I find it very important at generally – i.e., not just in anti-Zionist activism, but also in terms of how Jewish activism generally can work – for solidarity across minorities to be emphasized. That’s something you see a lot in the US, that an organization like JVP does.

That is really necessary here in Germany. There is a battle over who deserves more attention as a minority that suffers discrimination. That really gets in the way of the larger anti-racism and anti-discrimination struggle.

Of course, racists will also target Jews, but we are conditionally white and therefore, unless we’re wearing religious garb, we’re not going to get harassed by strangers as easily as people who simply look different. It’s a banal but important fact. It’s important to use the privilege that one does have and to create stronger ties between Jews and other minorities. That strengthens the Palestinian cause, too.

Berlin, for example, is the city with the largest Palestinian population in Europe. There are methods like BDS as a foreign activist policy, and there’s also the domestic activist policy of amplifying Palestinian voices, of trying to push the understanding that being pro-Palestine is part of the wider anti-racist cause rather than the wedge issue on the left.

Some people on the left think that fighting anti-Semitism takes precedence over fighting other kinds of discrimination. They follow the misguided logic that this equates to support for Israel in order to make up for the Holocaust. People on the left who otherwise support leftist causes end up supporting Jewish nationalism because they feel that Jews must be given this protected space. If you compare that to any other minority, the idea is normally for them to live without discrimination here and not to be sent off to some reservation.

Another tactic is to present to the majority the facts of the occupation. Point to the fact that increasingly more human rights organizations are talking about apartheid. One can’t just keep calling them all anti-Semitic. Germany can’t just put its head in the sand because of the Holocaust. We’re in a different situation now, in which a Jewish state is highly militarized, has nuclear weapons, and is supported by the most powerful countries in the world.

We can’t cling to this idea of the Jew as a victim. The Jew in Auschwitz is the image held in people’s minds in Germany, as is the Jew at risk from all these Muslim immigrants. Being against anti-Semitism then leads to a xenophobic way of protesting it. That is what I also see as part of our work because we are in Germany,  as opposed to Israel or in Palestine.

At the same time as supporting the international cause and trying to do international activism where we can, we’re also trying somehow to affect the German discourse. Because Germany is a major supporter of Israel – not just discursively but also militarily.