Berlin enters new surveillance era

Breaking down the new surveillance and policing law in Berlin


13/02/2026

Following the drastic shift in the policing landscape in Berlin over the last two years, the CDU/SPD coalition has scrambled to codify new police tactics into law. For those who have been at the forefront of the pro-Palestine movement in Berlin, this amendment comes as no surprise. Berliners have seen severe police brutality against demonstrators and an unprecedented use of surveillance and privacy breaches directed at the population, exposing the ultimate irony of Germany’s “data-privacy culture”, rooted in a historical distrust of surveillance and misuse of data.

Since 1975, police powers in Berlin have been regulated by the ASOG (Allgemeines Sicherheits- und Ordnungsgesetzes / General Security and Public Order Act). After two years of negotiations, the ruling coalition passed an extensive amendment of 736 unruly pages to this law. It entered into force in January 2026 and represents a shift towards preventive and data-driven policing in Berlin, amounting to one of the most aggressive expansions of policing and surveillance in Berlin’s post-war history.

What are the new changes to the law?

While the law represents a wide extension of powers granted to the Berlin police, in reality, it reflects tactics that had already been deployed by police against racialised communities for many years and were significantly escalated in response to pro-Palestine demonstrations across Berlin since late 2023. The media spectacle of physical violence during these demonstrations contributed to a broad support for the amendment to the law, granting the police a legal justification for their violent and unlawful tactics. 

The law places an alarming emphasis on predictive policing measures that broaden what police are allowed to do before a crime has even taken place, by anticipating potential threats with the help of AI surveillance technologies and through legalising telecommunications surveillance via court order. In practice, this means that surveillance has become legal, even if you are not under investigation, and before a warrant for your investigation is granted. Under the new rules, Berlin police are now allowed to:

  • Deploy AI-supported video surveillance in public spaces
  • Use predictive analytics systems that pool large volumes of police and administrative data
  • Use automated licence plate recognition
  • Analyse telecommunications and digital infrastructure in real time
  • Read encrypted messages via court order (so-called “source telecommunications surveillance”)
  • Covertly break into homes to install spyware on personal devices and use body cameras indoors
  • Scrape images from social media to train facial recognition systems
  • Use ‘fatal force’ 

How will it affect people in Berlin?

Under these new laws, some Berliners will face a new reality of permanent and invisible surveillance, particularly in neighbourhoods that are deemed ‘crime-prone areas’ or ‘kbO’ by the Berlin Police. There are currently seven locations in Berlin classified by the police as kbOs, namely kbO Alexanderplatz, kbO Görlitzer Park/Wrangelkiez, kbO Hermannplatz/Donaukiez, kbO Hermannstraße/Bahnhof Neukölln, kbO Kottbusser Tor, kbO Rigaer Straße, and kbO Warschauer Brücke. Neuköllners have drastically felt the impact of the kbO classification since 2023 due to the district’s high population of Arab (many of which are Palestinian) and Turkish residents. Although these classifications are not new, this type of profiling alongside new technologies of surveillance will inevitably disproportionately affect racialised people, unhoused people, young people, and activists. Predictive policing using AI all over the world has been shown to reproduce and amplify bias on vulnerable communities that are already over-policed, and does not reduce crime in these areas. 

Germany’s current efforts and budget commitments on both the national and the EU levels reflect an era of militarisation and the prioritisation of security over the protection of civil liberties. The Berlin 2026/27 budget sees a continued expansion of the security apparatus, where expenditure on police has increased from under €1.2 billion in 2010 to over €2 billion in 2024. Spending on defence and security technologies comes at the expense of social welfare, healthcare, public infrastructure, education, and civil society organisations, always at a direct detriment to the working class population. The burden of the harsh austerity measures imposed in the budget is one that Berliners can already see and feel in their everyday lives and within their communities. 

What “AI surveillance” actually means in practice

The new ASOG amendment enables the use of AI-based video surveillance systems designed not merely to record public space, but to analyse and evaluate behavior of pedestrians. Some listed applications of this technology include the detection of so-called unusual movement patterns, sudden changes in crowd behaviour such as the dispersal of groups, prolonged presence in one location (“loitering”), unattended objects, physical altercations, and the crossing of restricted perimeters. 

The amendment leaves broad room for further policing “experiments”, creating legal ambiguity over what is lawful, leaving those subjected to these systems with little legal recourse. The use of this technology warrants police to move beyond just responding to concrete evidence, and into the realm of prediction and pre-emptive suspicion. 

Three German federal states currently hold licenses for software by Palantir, a US tech company that builds AI-driven analytics software for law enforcement, national security, military tactics, and warfare. Berlin police have denied the use of Palantir’s technologies, but the new amendment invites exactly the kind of data-pooling, AI-driven policing systems already deployed in other German states under different names (Hessendata, VeRA, DAR, Gotham) to be deployed in Berlin as well. This is underscored by a report of Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron sitting at the table with a Palantir representative at the Summit on European Digital Sovereignty, raising concerns as to why a Palantir manager is represented at an EU initiative. 

These Palantir systems pull together data from multiple state or federal police databases into one searchable system, including biometrics, traffic videos, public data from internet, telephone and communications records, and other sources to link information and reveal patterns or connections. By merging large datasets this way, the systems generate detailed profiles and networks, with the inclusion of people who are not suspected of any crime, raising serious civil-liberties concerns about AI-powered policing.

How can Berliners stay vigilant? 

Staying vigilant does not mean paranoia, it means cultivating a culture of digital security and political awareness within your networks and communities. If you belong to one of the communities that are at most risk to the new law, now is the time to start being proactive about digital security, your individual and collective relationship to technology, and the power of collective action. For Berliners, vigilance can begin with small, practical changes and extend outward into collective action.

Digital Security

Keeping devices (software and hardware) up to date, using strong passwords instead of biometrics where possible, rebooting phones regularly, and securing your communication channels can all contribute to strengthening digital security. Tactical Tech’s Security in-a-box, developed with Front Line Defenders, is a good guide to get you started on protecting devices, communications, and data. It is designed precisely for people working or organising under conditions of heightened surveillance.

Rethinking “convenience” technologies

Many apps, platforms, and smart services quietly extract location data, contact lists, biometric information, or behavioural patterns. These technologies often double as surveillance infrastructure, as they extract far more personal data than necessary. Pausing to question whether an app is necessary, what data it collects, and who ultimately has access to it is a small but meaningful form of resistance. You can find an extensive list of resources compiled by Tactical Tech here: ‘The Persistent Problems Of Digital Resilience’

Collective action and public pressure

Security should not be treated as an individual responsibility. Sharing knowledge and agreeing on basic security practices within groups are forms of mutual care. Following or registering with civil society organisations can also help you stay informed and mobilise your communities, or they can help you in case of arrest, police violence, or security breaches. Collective mobilisation is also an accessible point of entry into resisting these measures—on 15 March 2026, Berlin will see a demonstration marking the International Day Against Police Violence, organised by the alliance Keine Einzelfälle. For further information and to register your interest in participation, you can email keine-einzelfaelle-berlin@riseup.net

The ASOG amendment is now law, but its implementation is not inevitable or uncontested. Public scrutiny, legal challenges, investigative journalism, demonstrations, and organised resistance can all play a role in preventing measures from becoming permanent. Although the amendment has entered into force, its meaning will be shaped by how it is resisted, challenged, and scrutinised in practice.

This article is a summary of research by the Berlin Surveillance and Predictive Policing Research Unit, a community research project hosted and initiated at Trust.support, and a panel discussion organised with guests Matthias Monroy, Lena Rohrbach and Petra Sußner that was held on the 19th of January 2026. Research for this article was compiled by Lina Martin-Chan, Filipp Smirnov, Chloê Langford, Peter Polack, and Jasmine Erkan.