Chapter 2

Israel, the Apartheid Analogy, and the Labor Question

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Why engage in a comparison of Israel/Palestine and apartheid South Africa? In principle, any society can be compared to any other society, but these two countries share features that make the comparison particularly interesting. Both came into being in the course of conflict between indigenous people and settler immigrants. The process of settlement took place as part of the overall expansion of European political and economic domination over the globe, albeit at different historical periods. The majority of settlers, especially in Israel/Palestine, did not come from the ranks of the principal colonizing power, the British Empire. In this sense, both processes were instances of surrogate colonization.

Perhaps of most significance is that in both places indigenous people never ceased to pose a challenge to settler domination. In many colonies the indigenous population was wiped out almost completely (the Caribbean, North America, and Australia) or merged to varying degrees with settlers (Central and South America). In other places, European powers conquered overseas territories but later withdrew without leaving behind permanent populations: the French in Algeria and Indochina, for example, and the Portuguese in southern Africa. Only in few places did the conflict continue as intensely as ever beyond the historical moment of global decolonization that started in the late 1940s. The originating violence that generally marks the foundation of new states and nations repeats itself on a daily basis in Israel/Palestine, but less so in South Africa since 1968, even if the demise of political apartheid has not led to a reduction of social inequalities.

Against this background of similarities there are also differences. I focus here on one issue that serves to set the two cases apart: the labor question. This refers both to labor's crucial role in molding the respective social orders and in shaping possibilities of resistance. The focus on labor is particularly necessary in view of the exclusive concern with political and legal issues in much of the comparative literature. A sociological approach can enhance our understanding of the operation of underlying and more profound social forces beyond obvious but superficial political and diplomatic events. We need to add this dimension to the analysis.

In conducting this comparison, we have to distinguish between two questions: 1) Is the notion of apartheid, which seems unique to South Africa, applicable to Israel/Palestine? and 2) Does the comparison between Israeli/ Palestinian and South African societies help us to understand them better?

The first question prompts us to engage international law while the second leads us to examine social and political developments in South Africa and Israel/Palestine against each other, make sense of their evolution, outline their similarities and differences, and draw analytical and practical-political conclusions. It is this latter task that is the focus of this chapter.

What Is Apartheid?

What precisely is apartheid? The answer seems simple: a system of political exclusion and domination that was in place in South Africa from 1948 to 1994. The apartheid era centered on attempts to impose legal, social, and geographical distinctions between people on the basis of race. At the same time, state policy sought to ensure that Black people continued to work for and serve white people, a principle that shaped the white-dominated economy and society for centuries of South African history.

Two major attempts have been made to expand the notion of apartheid beyond South African boundaries, with the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1973; and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which dates to 2002. The 1973 International Convention regards apartheid as "a crime against humanity" and a violation of international law. Apartheid is defined as "similar policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination as practised in southern Africa…committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them."[1]

A long list of such practices ensues, including measures to prevent a racial group from "participation in the political, social, economic and cultural life of the country" and creation of conditions that prevent full development "by denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human rights and freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form recognized trade unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their country, the right to a nationality, the right to freedom of movement and residence, the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."[2] This includes policies "designed to divide the population along racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the prohibition of mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to members thereof."[3]

This definition draws on apartheid in South Africa but cannot be reduced to it. A further step away from that historical case was taken with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which omitted all references to South Africa in its definition of "the crime of apartheid."[4] In its Article 7, addressing crimes against humanity, the Rome Statute defines the crime of apartheid as inhumane acts committed in the context of "an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime."[5] These acts include

"deportation or forcible transfer of population" and "persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender…or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law."[6] Persecution, in turn, is defined as "intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity."[7]

With the passage of time and the unfolding transformation of South Africa, apartheid is becoming a more legal and less descriptive term. While its association with South Africa remains strong, it has acquired a general meaning of systematic oppression and discrimination on the basis of origins. It is premature to delink it from its historical foundations, however. In the minds of many people, it continues to evoke a specific system rather than an abstract concept. For this reason, the best comparative strategy would pursue two tracks simultaneously: examine Israeli social practices by comparing them to their South African equivalents (and vice versa) and examine independently the applicability of international law to these practices.

If we use the international legal definition of apartheid, we do not need to retain a focus on South African racial policies and practices. And yet it would be useful to keep a focus on comparing South Africa and Israel, in order to highlight crucial features of Israeli/Palestinian history. We must keep in mind that the point of a comparative analysis is *not* to provide a list of similarities and differences for its own sake, but to use one case in order to reflect critically on the other and thus learn more about both.

Back in the 1960s, the South African Communist Party coined the term *colonialism of a special type* to refer to a system that combined the colonial legacies of racial discrimination, political exclusion, and socioeconomic inequalities with political independence from the British Empire. It used this novel concept to devise a strategy for political change that treated local whites as potential allies rather than as colonial invaders to be removed from the territory. Making analytical sense of apartheid in South Africa was relatively straightforward, since it was an integrated system of legal-political control. Different laws applied to different groups of people, but the source of authority was clear.

Making sense of the way apartheid as a legal concept may apply in Israel/Palestine is more complex. The degree of legal-political differentiation is greater, as it includes an array of military regulations in the 1967 occupied territories and policies delegating powers and resources to nonstate institutions (the Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund) that act on behalf of the state but are not open to public scrutiny. That much of the legal apparatus applies beyond Israeli boundaries—to all Jews, regarded as potential citizens, and to all Palestinians, regarded as prohibited persons—adds another dimension to the analysis. For this reason, we may talk about "apartheid of a special type"—a regime combining democratic norms, military rule, and exclusion or inclusion of extraterritorial populations.

What are some of the characteristics of this regime?

It is based on an ethnonational distinction between Jewish insiders and Palestinian Arab outsiders. This distinction has a religious dimension—you can join the Jewish group only through conversion—but is not affected by the degree of religious adherence.

It uses this distinction to expand citizenship beyond its territory, potentially to all Jews, and to contract citizenship within it: Palestinians in the occupied territories cannot become Israeli citizens. Israel is open to all nonresident members of one ethnonational group, wherever they are and regardless of personal history and links to the territory. It is closed to all nonresident members of the other ethnonational group, wherever they are and regardless of personal history and links to the territory.

It is based on the permanent blurring of physical boundaries. At no point in its sixty-seven years of existence has its boundaries been fixed by law, nor are they likely to become fixed in the foreseeable future. They are thus permanently temporary, porous in one direction, through expansion of military and civilian forces into neighboring territories, and impermeable in another direction: severe restrictions or prohibition on entry of Palestinians from the occupied territories and the diaspora into its territories.

It combines different modes of rule: formal democratic institutions to the west of the Green Line and military authority with no democratic pretensions across it. In times of crisis, the military mode of rule tends to spill over the Green Line to apply to Palestinian citizens of Israel. At all times, civilian rule spills over the Green Line to apply to Jewish settlers (in the West Bank). The distinction between the two sides of the line is constantly eroding as a result, and norms and practices developed under the occupation filter back into Israel—as the phrase goes, the "Jewish democratic state" is "democratic" for Jews and "Jewish" for Arabs.

It is in fact a "Jewish-demographic state." Demography— the fear that Jews may become a minority—is a prime concern behind the policies of mainstream forces. All state structures, policies, and efforts aim to meet the concern for a permanent Jewish majority exercising domination in the state of Israel.

How do these features compare with historical South African apartheid?

The foundation of apartheid was a racial distinction between whites and Blacks (further divided into Coloureds, Indians, and Africans, with the latter subdivided into ethnic groups), rather than an ethnonational distinction. Racial groups were internally divided on the basis of language, religion, and ethnic origins and externally linked in various ways across the color line. This can be contrasted with Israel/Palestine, in which lines of division usually overlap: potential bases for cross-cutting affiliations existed early on—Arabic-speaking Jews in the region, indigenous Palestinian Jewish communities—but were undermined by the simultaneous rise of the Zionist movement and Arab nationalism in the twentieth century.

In South Africa then, there was a contradiction between the organization of the state around the single axis of race and a social reality that allowed for some diversity in practice and multiple lines of division as well as cooperation. This opened up opportunities for change. The state endeavored to eliminate this contradiction by entrenching residential, educational, religious, and cultural segregation, but its capacity was limited and eroded over time. In Israel/Palestine there is tighter fit between the organization of the state and social reality, with one exception: Palestinian citizens are positioned between Jewish citizens and Palestinian noncitizens. They are the only population segment that is fully bilingual, familiar with political and cultural contexts across the ethnic divide. They have enough freedom to organize but not enough rights to support the oppressive status quo. They may thus act as crucial catalysts for change.

A key goal of the apartheid state was to ensure that Black people performed their role as providers of labor without presenting difficult social and political challenges. The strategy for that focused on externalizing them. They were physically present in white homes, factories, farms, and service industries but were absent, politically and legally, as rights-bearing citizens. Those no longer or not yet functional for white employers were prevented from living in the urban areas: children, women—especially mothers— and old people. Able-bodied Blacks working in the cities were supposed to commute—daily, monthly, or annually, depending on the distance—between the places where they had jobs but no political rights and places where they had political rights but no jobs.

This system of migrant labor opened up a contradiction between political and economic imperatives. It broke down families and the social order, hampered efforts to create a skilled labor force, reduced productivity, and gave rise to crime and social protest. The effort to control people's movements created a bloated and expensive repressive apparatus, which put a constant burden on resources and capacities. Domestic and industrial employers faced increasing difficulties in meeting their labor needs. It went from an economic asset (for white people) to a liability. It simply had to go.

The economic imperative of the Israeli system, in contrast, has been to create employment for Jewish immigrants. Palestinian labor was used by certain groups at certain times because it was available and convenient, but it was never central to Jewish prosperity in Israel. After the outbreak of the first intifada in the late 1980s, and under conditions of globalization, it could easily be replaced by politically unproblematic foreign workers. A massive wave of Russian Jewish immigration in the 1990s helped this process. The externalization of Palestinians, through denial of rights, ethnic

cleansing, and *hafrada* (Hebrew for "separation"), has presented limited economic problems for Israeli Jews. Its impact will not undermine Israeli apartheid as it did apartheid in South Africa.

Apartheid was last in a series of regimes in which European settlers dominated indigenous Black people in South Africa. People of European origins were a minority, relying on military force, technology, and divide-and-conquer strategies to entrench their rule. Demography was not a major concern as long as security of person, property, and investment could be guaranteed. When repression proved counterproductive, a deal exchanging political power for ongoing prosperity became acceptable to the majority of whites. Israeli Jews, for whom a demographic majority is seen as the guarantee of political survival on their own terms, are not likely to accept a similar deal.

In summary then, Israel's "apartheid of a special type" is different from apartheid in South Africa in three major respects:

At its foundation are consolidated and relatively impermeable ethnonational identities, with few crosscutting affiliations across the principal ethnic divide in society.

It is relatively free of economic imperatives that run counter to its overall exclusionary thrust, because it is not dependent on the exploitation of indigenous labor.

Its main quest is for demographic majority as the basis for legal, military, and political domination.

How can we account for these three points of difference? To answer that, we have to examine them from a historical perspective, with a focus on patterns of settlement and resistance during the colonial period.

Israel/Palestine: The Dynamics of Exclusion

By the time the state of Israel was established in 1948, Mandate Palestine had been transformed over the preceding decades from a predominantly rural society, where people engaged in agricultural production for subsistence and to some extent for the local markets, into a much more urbanized and industrialized society. This process was initiated by indigenous social forces—merchants, landlords, and peasants—who took advantage of opportunities created by Palestine's greater integration into the world market since the mid-nineteenth century. Economic development was further accelerated under the impact of Zionist settlement, which attracted into the country large amounts of capital, advanced technology, and production methods as well as many skilled immigrants.

By increasing internal inequalities, this pattern of economic growth proved a mixed blessing for the indigenous Arab population. A minority managed to prosper as a result of commodification of land, growing commercialization of production, and the creation of large urban markets for agricultural goods. The majority, however, became less secure in their position as the impact of these same processes undermined social stability and made their hold on the land more tenuous. Despite these disruptive forces, throughout the pre-1948 period Palestinians retained control over most of the productive land in the country *as a community* and did not fall under the domination of settlers. Although many lost their land *as individuals*, only a small percentage were engaged in the service of settlers. The rest were largely self-employed (primarily on the land) or employed by other Palestinians as well as by state and international companies.

The capacity before 1948 of Palestinians to hold their ground; retain access to land, labor, and capital; and participate in economic development on relatively solid foundations was a major reason for the exclusionary direction taken by class relations. It coincided with the dominant settler strategy of building a self-sufficient economic sector that would not be dependent on the indigenous labor force and would provide for minimal contact between the two ethnonational communities. This exclusionary trend was facilitated by the British authorities, which made little effort to encourage intercommunal relations. Communal disengagement was never complete, but the overall tendency was toward ever greater separation between Jews and Arabs, to the point that in 1947 the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) likened the relations between the communities to trade between nations.

The same period saw the consolidation of mutually exclusive national identities, Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Jewish, and corresponding sets of separate political institutions. Arabs and Jews became distinct from each other in terms of language, history, religion, and ethnic identity. They entered the period with few overlapping affiliations, and, in the course of their encounters, even the little they had had in common did not survive. The local Jewish community, which had shared some cultural characteristics with indigenous Arabs (such as language and residential patterns), diminished numerically and was marginalized politically. Affiliation to external foci of identity—the Arab nation and Islamic world and the worldwide Jewish people, respectively—reinforced their separation.

When the final clash of 1947–1948 broke out, two distinct groups, which had established their own systems of class relations, national identities, and political institutions, confronted one another. The coherence and capacity of Zionist-led structures and their degree of organization were far higher than their Palestinian equivalents, and, as a result, they emerged victorious from the conflict. In the process of consolidating their control, they evicted hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from the territories that became the state of Israel and prevented those who fled under duress, or were expelled, from returning to their homes (a process known as the *Nakba)*.

Emptying the territory of 80 percent of its indigenous residents left a huge gap, geographically and socially, that was filled in the early 1950s by Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa. Palestinian workers had been marginal to the Jewish economy before 1948 and were not missed as a source of labor. On the contrary, their displacement was deemed beneficial, perhaps essential, for a successful absorption of immigrants, who were (re)settled by the state onto land that had belonged to Palestinians. A new Jewish working class thus developed, consisting of immigrants who moved into recently vacated neighborhoods in the big cities (Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem), depopulated towns (such as Ramle, Lydda/Lod, Beersheba, and Beisan), and newly established "development towns," formed in areas where many Palestinian communities used to live or along the borders.

With the 1948 *Nakba*, the majority of Palestinians found themselves excluded from participation in Israeli social and economic structures, either because their areas fell under Arab foreign rule (Jordan in the West Bank and Egypt in Gaza) or because they became refugees in other Arab countries. Only a minority of 15 percent became citizens of Israel. After an initial period of military closure and restrictions on movement and employment, from the

late 1950s Palestinian Israelis started joining the labor force in growing numbers but never reached the central position occupied by Black workers in the white-dominated economy in South Africa. They remained a minority, geographically marginal, largely employed in non-strategic industries (agriculture, construction), with limited capacity to defend their own interests, let along bring about change in the society at large.

The 1967 War and the subsequent occupation reestablished unified rule over the entire country. But, unlike Palestinians under Israeli rule since 1948, who were granted citizenship as a small and subordinated minority, Arab residents of the West Bank and Gaza remain without basic social and political rights to this day. For a period of twenty years, they were employed in the lowest-paid positions in the labor market, commuting between their homes and workplaces. Like Palestinian citizens before them, they were restricted to agriculture, construction, and sanitation, while more lucrative positions in industry and services remained in the hands of Jewish workers. An ethnic hierarchy saw Ashkenazi Jews at the top, followed by Mizrahim, then Palestinian citizens, and occupied Palestinians at the bottom. Unlike in South Africa, Jewish settlers remained the largest segment of the working class as well as those best positioned strategically to fight for rights and resources.

In other words, Palestinian workers after 1967 were visible and important in some sectors, but they never became central to the Israeli labor market as a whole. With the uprising of 1987—the first intifada—followed by the Gulf War of 1991 and the Oslo process, even that limited role as suppliers of labor was curtailed. Frequent military closures imposed on the occupied territories, and the growing integration of the Israeli economy into global markets, encouraged the replacement of Palestinian laborers with foreign workers (from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia in particular). Over the last twenty-five years, the role of Palestinian labor declined to such an extent that it practically disappeared from the Israeli scene in economic or political terms.

Beyond the obvious economic implications, this state of affairs has had an impact on resistance politics as well: the central role played by the labor movement in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa cannot be replicated in Israel/Palestine. Palestinian workers do not possess the crucial strategic leverage deployed by their South African counterparts. The link between race and class shaped Black politics for decades and provided the social foundation for the alliance between the main liberation movement (African National Congress [ANC]), Black-led trade unions (South African Congress of Trade Unions, Congress of South African Trade Unions), and the Communist Party. We cannot imagine opposition to apartheid without it. And yet, apartheid of a special type in Israel/Palestine has experienced nothing like that, nor is it likely to in the future. Why has South Africa moved in a different direction?

South Africa: The Dynamics of Incorporation

Contemporary South Africa is the product of a long history that saw groups of imperial powers and settlers (the Dutch East India Company, the British Empire, Afrikaner and English settlers, missionaries, farming and mining capitalists), collaborate and compete over the control of indigenous groups, themselves divided by language, religion, political affiliation, territory, and

social conditions. A prolonged period of expansion, stretching over 250 years from the mid-seventeenth century to the late nineteenth century, witnessed many micro-level interactions between these forces and created a multilayered system of domination, collaboration, and resistance. Numerous political entities—British colonies, Boer republics, independent African kingdoms, autonomous missionary territories—emerged as a result, accompanied by different social relations, including slavery, indentured labor, communal production, various forms of land and labor tenancy, sharecropping, and wage labor.

By the late nineteenth century, a more systematic approach had begun to crystallize. It was used to streamline the preexisting multiplicity of conditions and policies into a more uniform mode of control. Between 1903 and 1979, a series of official commissions of inquiry, focusing on the "native question," proposed policies to improve control and stabilize white rule. Apartheid was one link in that chain, seeking to close existing loopholes and entrench white domination while continuing to use Black labor as the economic foundation of the system. Even under apartheid, the rhetoric about segregation and separation could not disguise the need for using Black workers not only on farms and mines but also, increasingly, in industry and services as well.

During the same period, the nature of resistance changed as well, from attempts to ward off settler attacks and retain or regain independence in the nineteenth century to a struggle for incorporation on an equal basis in the Union of South Africa that came into being in 1910. The ANC, formed in 1912, became the most important movement to pursue that goal. Since the 1930s most Black political movements aimed to take over and transform the existing state rather than create their own independent institutions and state structures. National liberation was defined as the key goal, but it was seen largely as a way to allow Black people to access their birthright on an equal basis in their homeland rather than return to a real or imaginary free and unified precolonial past.

By the late 1970s, it had become clear to white business and political leaders that apartheid was counterproductive to ensuring white prosperity. The system began to crack because it was too costly and cumbersome and increasingly irrational from an economic point of view: it hampered the creation of an internal market and prevented a shift to a technology-oriented growth strategy. The resistance movement that grew in strength after the 1976 Soweto uprising, combined with international pressure and increasing stress on the state's resources, gave the final push toward a negotiated settlement. That settlement took the form of a unified political framework, within which numerous social struggles continue to unfold.

It is important to realize that the South African postapartheid state, which grants equal rights to all citizens, was made possible by specific historical circumstances outlined above: a diversity of groups brought together in a long process that involved a multiplicity of local circumstances and interactions. This was accompanied by the formation of intimate— but highly unequal—relations between racial groups through the employment of Black laborers in the white-dominated economy as well as domestic and childcare workers in most white households. It is this "insider" position that allowed Black South Africans to organize in order to change the system from within, an option not open to the bulk of Palestinians.

Why Are These Differences Important?

Given these different histories, the South African "rainbow nation," based on the multiplicity of identities and the absence of a single axis of division to bring them all together and bind them—*unity in diversity*—is unlikely to be followed as a model in Israel/Palestine. Elements such as the mutual dependency between white business and Black labor; the shared use by all groups of the English language as the medium of political communication, business, and higher education; and Christianity as a religious umbrella for the majority of people from all racial groups do not exist in Israel/Palestine. These features emerged in South Africa through a long process of territorial expansion, conquest of indigenous people, and their incorporation as "hewers of wood and drawers of water" in the growing economy. They cannot be created from scratch by using attractive slogans that are not historically grounded.

This difference aside, if we consider pre-1967 Israel in isolation, some elements similar to the South African experience can be identified. People of all backgrounds—Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews, Russian and Ethiopian immigrants, and Palestinian citizens—use Hebrew in their daily interactions and share similar social and cultural tastes. In mixed towns, such as Haifa, Jaffa, and Acre, neighborhoods exist in which Jews and Arabs live together with little to distinguish their lifestyles except for their home language. One does not have to idealize the situation to recognize that these people have much more in common with one another than white suburbanites have with rural Black South Africans, during apartheid or today.

Politically, this means a focus on working for a "one-state solution" within pre-1967 Israel's borders as a state for all its citizens, at least in the immediate-to-medium term: not an easy task in light of recent right-wing campaigns to enhance the Jewish character of the state and the return, in the 2015 elections, of the hard right to power, possibly in an ever harsher form. This means a need to campaign for making Israel a proper democratic state in which ethnoreligious affiliation confers no political privileges. Can the antiapartheid movement in South Africa provide lessons for the struggle to democratize Israel, terminate the occupation, and extend equal rights to all Israelis and Palestinians?

Yes, it can, provided we understand the core strength of the movement: its grounding in local conditions and reliance on mass mobilization in the streets, factories, schools, townships, and communities. The ability to generate support overseas was based on the movement's widely recognized claim to represent the masses and lead them in struggle, above all through the trade union movement and the United Democratic Front, which brought together hundreds of community organizations, unions, women and student constituencies, progressive religious movements, white draft resisters, and so on. The slogan "one person, one vote" provided a banner behind which people inside and outside the country could march together.

The Palestinian solidarity movement sets out to replicate the achievements of the antiapartheid struggle but with no equivalent mass movement that seeks to mobilize people on the basis of labor conditions and socioeconomic demands. In a sense, it acts as if the cart could pull the proverbial horse. Activists must consider the implications of the absence of a grounded mass movement in Israel when aiming to build on the South African experience. The key difference between the South African apartheid regime, with its massive dependence on Black labor power, and the Israeli regime, which has relied historically on the labor power of

immigrant Jews, is behind this contrast. Labor exploitation in South Africa led to the creation of a mass movement of workers and township residents, willing and able to overturn the apartheid regime from within, while Palestinians have been restricted to a large extent to struggling against the oppressive regime from the outside. Uplifting slogans that assert the similarity of conditions and strategies between the two cases cannot disguise this deep sociopolitical difference.

Identifying Israel as an apartheid regime (of a special type) is just the beginning of the task, then. It is not a substitute for an analysis of the specific features of the regime, its strong and vulnerable spots, its allies and opponents. Strategies used successfully in South Africa may be relevant to struggles in Israel/Palestine only if they can be adjusted to the different context. Perhaps the most important lesson of the South African movement is its originality, having worked with no preconceived models in order to develop a unique combination of passive resistance, mass defiance, marches, popular mobilization, and militant tactics, seeking to involve different segments of the population based on their concrete needs and demands. What activists should emulate then, is this creative attitude rather than any fixed set of tactics (such as boycott, divestment, and sanctions), regardless of the historical background and current circumstances.

Without offering any ready-made recipes for action (they do not exist), it is safe to say that three broad principles can guide the re-examination of political strategies today: the need for internal unity among Palestinians on each side of the Green Line, and between both sides, based on mass action; the need to use such action as a foundation for work with marginalized Israeli-Jewish constituencies to address their own social concerns; and the need for global solidarity efforts. How to translate these principles into concrete strategy will remain the task of scholars and activists on all sides.